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Abstract 
 
Extractive natural resources have always been associated with negative outcomes in sub-
Saharan countries. However, it is essential to investigate the extent to which domestic 
political conditions influence ownership structures, which may or may not subsequently result 
in adverse outcomes. Through a comparative analysis between the cases of Angola and 
Botswana, this study finds that, political contestation influences ownership models as 
hypothesized to an extent. In Angola, the post-independence civil war pitting the ruling MPLA 
against UNITA resulted in Sonangol being managed as a wholly owned state enterprise, 
albeit serving the interests of the MPLA elite instead of broad-based developmental interests. 
In Botswana, however, Debswana was managed as a public-private entity located within a 
democratic political system, and this ownership structure was more a result of rational policy 
planning than political contestation. Nevertheless, the cases’ history of colonial rule and 
political institutions established upon the attainment of political independence are 
substantially influential factors as well. Non-settler colonialism and non-militarized political 
transitions to independence facilitated the growth of “organic” political and economic 
institutions and public-private ownership structures in Botswana, while settler colonialism 
and pre-independence militarization influenced the growth of centralized post-colonial state 
structures internal strife in Angola. The timing of resource extraction was also important, 
with pre-independence oil extraction influencing militarized rivalry in Angola, while post-
independence extraction of diamonds in Botswana was a causal factor in the development of 
strong state institutions. External factors, particularly the Cold War influenced militarised 
outcomes in Angola, while the nature of the global diamond market had a contributory factor 
to the establishment of the public-private ownership model in Botswana. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Political Contestation and Ownership Structures  
Extractive natural resources like oil and diamonds are the leading source of revenue 
for several countries in post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa. Africa’s role as one of the 
leading exporters of raw materials can be traced back to the colonial era and since 
then, Western and Asian economies, which constitute the world’s largest economies 
offer lucrative markets for Africa’s extractive natural resources, such as oil and 
diamonds. Where natural resources abound, governments are directly involved in the 
processes of producing and managing resource revenue. However, most African 
governments have a poor record in this regard, experiencing “resource curse” 
outcomes such as weak, undifferentiated economies, authoritarian governance, zero-
sum political rule, patron-client relationships, corruption and political violence. 1 
Notable examples in this regard include Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Angola and 
Sierra Leone.  
 
While there is considerable agreement regarding this “paradox of plenty”, or 
predominantly negative relationship between natural resource wealth, the state’s 
involvement and development outcomes, the link between domestic political 
conditions and state corporations’ ownership structures is often under-investigated2. 
Where they are taken into account, ownership structures are not commonly analyzed 
as a variable but a constant3. This research this seeks to fill this gap by analyzing the 
extent to which domestic political conditions influence the ownership structures that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Standing, A. (2007). “Corruption and the Extractive Industries in Africa: Can Combating Corruption 
2  Luong, P.J and Weinthal, E. (2006). “Rethinking The Resource Curse: Ownership Structure, 
Institutional Capacity, And Domestic Constraints.” Annual Review Of Political Science. Vol. 9: 241-
263  
3 Ibid, 2006 
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are adopted in state corporations. Both variables have significant implications for 
development. State corporations, or parastatals are at the centre of the production and 
revenue management processes in most resource rich African countries. They do this 
either in partnership with private multinational corporations or as wholly owned by 
the countries’ respective governments. Since extractive natural resources occupy a 
strategic position in such countries, governments tend to maintain effective presence 
in the corporations through shareholding and regulatory control4.  
Ownership models are thus a key aspect in this regard, since they determine how 
resource revenue is managed and whether the wealth becomes a  “curse” or a 
“blessing”. Luong and Weinthal (2006) categorise ownership models as state 
ownership with control, state ownership without control, private domestic ownership 
and private foreign ownership5. Each of these categories, which shall be elaborated on 
later in this study entail different levels of state involvement in the management of 
resource wealth. Thus, the nature of the prevailing political system usually influences 
the governments’ choices of ownership structures. Authoritarian regimes are more 
likely to prefer state ownership models with full regulatory control and minimal 
transparency, and this increases the likelihood of negative developmental outcomes. 
On the other hand, more open and transparent political systems are more likely to 
adopt ownership structures that entail limited state shareholding, such as public-
private partnerships that are more transparent and usually result in relatively 
favourable developmental outcomes.6  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 McPherson, C. (2010). “State participation in the natural resource sectors Evolution, issues and 
outlook.” in Daniel, P, Keen M and McPherson, C. (eds) The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: 
Principles, Problems and Practice. Routledge, London. 
5 Op. cit, Luong and Weinthal, 2006 
6 Op. cit, Luong and Weinthal, 2006 
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This study shall investigate the influence of domestic political conditions on 
ownership models using a comparative study between Debswana (Botswana) and 
Sonangol (Angola). Both cases are resource rich sub-Saharan countries, with state 
corporations being at the centre of the production and management of diamond and 
oil revenue respectively. However, they have different political regimes, ownership 
models and consequently developmental outcomes. Botswana is the world’s leading 
diamond producer by value and globally regarded as an exemplary stable democracy 
and developmental state in sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, Angola, which is 
one of the leading oil producers in the world, remains one of the most poorly 
governed countries in Africa, with unimpressive developmental indicators despite 
vast oil and diamond revenues.  
Both countries’ governing parties (Movimento Popular de Libertação de 
Angola/Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola/MPLA) and Botswana 
Democratic Party in Angola and Botswana respectively) have been in power since the 
countries attained political independence in 1975 and 1966 respectively. Angola’s 
largest state corporation (Sonangol) is wholly owned by the state and is the sole 
authority as far as oil prospecting, extraction and marketing is concerned. Debswana 
is Botswana’s largest state corporation that is responsible for all diamond exploration 
and marketing processes in the country. Botswana’s government holds 50% 
shareholding, with private foreign company De Beers holding the other 50%.  
Through a comparative analysis, this study finds that, political contestation influences 
ownership models, especially if the state is under threat from both internal and 
external actors. Angola’s MPLA government established Sonangol in 1976, a year 
after attaining political independence from Portugal amidst the beginning of a civil 
war that would last for 27 years. The company remained undisturbed by the war, and 
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served to fund the MPLA’s war effort, in addition to sustaining politics of patronage. 
Botswana’s BDP government on the other hand established Debswana two years after 
independence in 1968, but this occurred without formidable political contestation to 
the country’s fledgling democratic system. This study also finds that although the 
extractive natural resources under study are different (oil in Angola and diamonds in 
Botswana), they did not substantially shape the ownership models adopted by the 
respective states. Oil, which is capital intensive and attracts relatively fewer actors, 
resulted in the concentration of government authority over revenue in Angola, while 
kimberlitic diamond mining, was managed through a private-public ownership 
structure instead due to the country’s domestic political conditions. 
Furthermore, the history of colonial rule and the nature of the transition to 
independence substantially influenced the country’s post-colonial political conditions. 
Angola experienced Portuguese settler rule, with three armed nationalist groups 
operating in the country before the granting of political independence in 1975. 
Although the groups did not manage to force independence through a military victory, 
this militarized anti-colonial nationalism laid the foundation for the subsequent post-
colonial civil war. Botswana, on the other hand had a single dominant nationalist 
party (BDP) prior to the granting of political independence in 1965, and its negotiated 
independence occurred in the absence of militarized agitation or political violence as 
well. This facilitated the subsequent growth and development of “organic” political 
and economic institutions. In addition, this study found the timing of resource 
extraction to be a critical factor in the creation of conditions that influenced the states’ 
choices in managing their respective natural resources. Angola’s oil was already 
being exported a few years prior to independence and this fuelled the post-
independence conflict since control of the state meant controlling the vast oil 
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revenues; and the MPLA also used oil revenues to fund their war effort against 
UNITA. Botswana, on the other hand discovered diamonds in 1967, a year after 
independence and it was also one of the poorest countries in the world at the time. As 
a result, the public-private model of resource management that the country adopted 
occurred without the existence of a high rent-generating natural resource that the state 
controlled. 	  
Research Question, Hypotheses and Variables 
The paper seeks to answer the following question: To what extent does domestic 
political contestation influence the form of ownership that political leaders of 
resource rich countries take in state corporations? 
It is guided by the following hypotheses: 
H1: High levels of political contestation decrease the likelihood of full and 
discretionary government ownership of state corporations 
H2: The presence of alternative export revenue increases the likelihood of private 
domestic partnerships, which limit discretionary government control in state 
corporations. 
This study is a qualitative, comparative case based research project. Variables shall be 
identified and operationalized as follows: 
 
Independent Variables 
The domestic political environment shall consist of political regime and political 
contestation, defined and operationalised as follows: 
1. Political Contestation: This generally describes the level of political 
competition between various actors within a country’s political system. It will 
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be operationalised according to the strength and number of contending actors 
in the system, and the nature of political competition.  
2. Political Regime: This generally describes the form of government in a 
country supported by various institutions and cultural norms and values. In 
this research political regimes shall be operationalised according to type the 
governance structure and actions that follow from its institutional nature. 
Dependent Variables 
1. State corporations: These can be defined as publicly owned companies, 
either run wholly or partly by the state. A company with 50% or more 
government shareholding shall be categorised as a state corporation for the 
purposes of this research. This study will focus on two state corporations, 
Angola’s Sonangol and Botswana’s Debswana. 
2. Form of ownership: This shall be operationalised according to the 
shareholding structure that that a government takes in a state corporation. 
Additional features such as the government’s regulatory control shall also be 
considered. 
Aim & Rationale 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between domestic political 
conditions and subsequent ownership models adopted in state corporations. This in 
turn poses long-term implications for political and economic development in resource 
rich African countries. Such a politically grounded comparative historical study 
contributes to better understanding of structural factors that account for present day 
institutional developments in resource rich countries. By comparing a relatively 
successful case (Botswana) and a weaker case (Angola) this research seeks to make 
conclusions that can be generalized to other cases in the sub-Saharan African 
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geopolitical region. Furthermore, the ‘Africa Rising’7 thesis projects high economic 
development in African countries in the next ten years; and investment in natural 
resources will drive this expected growth to a considerable extent. It is thus essential 
to contribute to the development of knowledge and insight into the relationship 
between domestic political conditions and state corporations in national development. 
Lastly, by investigating how state corporations function, this research will generate 
more understanding on a subject of considerable importance since the corporations 
are a prominent institution both in resource and non-resource rich sub-Saharan 
countries.  
This research report shall be structured as follows. The second chapter will consist of 
a discussion of the main theoretical approaches to be tested in this research on the 
relationship between domestic political conditions and ownership structures in state 
corporations. The third chapter will be a literature review, in which I will discuss key 
works on the background to state building in sub-Saharan Africa, natural resource 
revenue management and political contestation. The fouth chapter chapter will be 
composed of a comparative discussion between the case studies, showing the extent to 
which domestic political conditions shaped the ownership models that were 
eventually established in the companies. The fifth chapter will consist of an analysis 
of findings and conclusion section, outlining the study’s key findings and highlighting 
their implications to debates and policy on natural resource management in sub-
Saharan Africa. This shall be followed by a bibliography of sources cited in the 
report. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  August, O. (2013). “Africa Rising: A Hopeful Continent.” The Economist, March 2nd 2013. 
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21572377-african-lives-have-already-greatly-
improved-over-past-decade-says-oliver-august. Accessed April 30th 2014 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
This research shall be deductive in nature in its testing of a theory propounded by 
Luong and Weinthal (2006). They argue that the ownership structure that a country 
adopts depends on domestic constraints which political leaders face. 8  This is 
particularly important when mineral wealth is first discovered or when political 
independence is granted. Usually, governments are unwilling to cede control of rent-
generating resource sectors to private control due to strategic concerns. Instead, they 
monopolise exploration, production and management of resource wealth. This 
accounts for the authoritarian state traditions which frequently emerge out of resource 
rich countries.9 
In addition, they argue that political contestation works in tandem with the presence 
of alternative export revenue. This is primarily because economic diversification 
creates multiple actors, who are also invested in institutional strength thus 
diminishing the likelihood of discretionary and unaccountable ownership models in 
natural resource governance. As a result, each form of ownership which political 
leaders eventually take creates a particular set of actors, business-state relations and 
distinct institutional outcomes.10 Private domestic ownership, which fosters stronger 
regulatory and fiscal institutional frameworks, is thus regarded as the best resource 
governance model. Therefore, the absence of high political contestation and 
alternative sources of revenue in most resource rich countries results in more 
discretionary ownership models which create weak (fiscal and regulatory) institutions 
in most resource rich African states. The relationship between domestic political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Luong and Weinthal, Op. Cit, p 244 
9 Luong and Weinthal, Op. cit, p 245 
10 Loc cit 
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conditions and ownership models as hypothesised in this research can be 
diagrammatically illustrated as follows: 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1:Domestic political conditions and ownership models 
 
A deductive approach that has variance on the outcomes of both cases shall be used. 
Deductive research is a theory testing approach, commencing with an established 
theory or generalisation and verifying plausibility through application to various 
instances11. Process tracing shall also be used in determining causal mechanisms that 
account for variance. An essential tool in qualitative research, process tracing is 
defined as, “the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed 
in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator12.” In this 
research it shall be used to determine the extent to which domestic political conditions 
influence state corporations’ ownership structures. Collier notes that process tracing 
is, “an analytic tool used for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from 
diagnostic pieces of evidence, often understood as part of a temporal sequence of 
events or phenomena.”13 He further notes that process tracing’s strength as a tool of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Hyde, K.F. (2000) “Recognising deductive processes in qualitative research.” International Market 
Research Journal. Number 2, Volume 3. Pp  82-89 
12 Collier, D. (2011). “Understanding Process Tracing.” Political Science and Politics, 44, No. 4. pp 
823-830 
13 Collier, D Op.Cit, p. page 824 
Domestic 
Political 
Conditions 
Political 
Leaders 
Ownership 
Models 
Adopted in 
State 
Corporations 
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causal inference is additionally expressed by its facilitation of careful description and 
analysis of specific moments and characterizing key steps in a process under 
investigation. 14  Therefore, process tracing shall be used to conduct a detailed 
analytical and historical account of the unfolding of events from the point of 
acquisition of political independence, discovery of natural resources and subsequent 
establishment of state corporations within the specific domestic political context and 
implications for resource governance in the long term. This will also entail analyzing 
the effects of political leaders’ policy choices in response to domestic conditions that 
they faced.  
Further, George and Bennett indicate that a variant of process tracing, dubbed 
‘analytical explanation’ can convert a historical narrative into an analytical causal 
explanation couched in theory.15 Therefore in investigating the extent to which 
domestic conditions shaped the ownership models that were adopted in Angola and 
Botswana, the research will employ this variant of process tracing. The technique of 
equifinality 16  shall also be used, where alternative paths of causality between 
variables shall be considered. Thus in addition to domestic political contexts 
influencing ownership structures adopted in Angola and Botswana, alternative causal 
factors shall also be taken into account. A comparative qualitative approach is the 
most befitting for this study because it facilitates an in depth analysis of the causal 
mechanisms that account for variance in the dependent variable. Comparison is 
widely regarded as a fundamental analytical tool which, in addition to sharpening 
descriptions, plays an integral role in concept formation through bringing into view 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Loc cit 
15 George, A.L & Bennett, A. (2005).  Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 
Cambridge, MA. MIT Press 
16 Loc cit 
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suggestive similarities and contrasts between cases 17 . In this study, nuanced 
conclusions shall thus be drawn from juxtaposing two cases which share similarities, 
albeit with divergent outcomes.   
As alluded to earlier, both Angola and Botswana are rich in extractive natural 
resources, oil and diamonds respectively. However, Angola experienced civil war 
soon after independence in 1976. In spite of intense domestic (military) contestation, 
Sonangol flourished into a multinational conglomerate efficiently managed by skilled 
personnel and wholly owned by the MPLA-led government. Nationally, however 
Angola has experienced dire developmental outcomes depite substantial oil revenues. 
Botswana, on the other hand experienced electoral contestation since independence in 
between the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and opposition parties like the 
Botswana National Front. Debswana was formed in 1968, a year in which the BDP 
also garnered 68% of the national electoral vote.  Despite subsequent elections since 
then, BDP has won them all with a fair parliamentary majority. It has also maintained 
a 50% shareholding model in Debswana with De Beers, the world’s leading diamond 
cartel. Thus in comparing the two cases, invaluable conclusions regarding the causal 
relationships between domestic political conditions and ownership models shall be 
made. This will also contribute to a better understanding of subsequent effects of 
ownership models onto the governance of natural resources and developmental 
outcomes at large. 
Case Selection 
Cases were empirically selected on the basis of being rich in extractive natural 
resources, managed by state corporations and having strong post-colonial regimes that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Collier, P. (1993). “The Comparative Method” in Ada W. Finifter (ed). Political Science: The state 
of the discipline (II). Washington DC: American Political Science Association 
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also participated in the establishment of these corporations. Both countries are former 
colonies and attained political independence between 1960 and 1975.  Thus, the time 
period under consideration in this study is primarily when Sonangol and Debswana 
were formed, which for both cases was within the first two years of acquiring political 
independence. They also occupy the same geo-political region (sub-Saharan Africa). 
However, they had different domestic political conditions and divergent ownership 
structures in state corporations and also experience different developmental outcomes. 
Botswana is Africa’s leading diamond producer by value, with diamond revenue 
accounting for 70-80% of its export earnings18 . Exploration and marketing of 
diamonds is conducted through Debswana, where government holds 50% 
shareholding with private partner De Beers holding the other 50%. Botswana is also a 
model sub-Saharan African democracy with relatively high developmental indicators. 
Its success is attributed to effective usage of resource rents to fund developmental 
policies.  
Angola is the second case study. A leading oil exporter, it became a member of OPEC 
in 2006. Oil exports account for 85% of Angola’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP)19. 
Established in 1976, Sonangol is Angola’s sole oil concessionaire, sector regulator, 
tax gathering agent and manager of oil revenue20. The parastatal is wholly owned by 
the Angolan state. However, Angola has a poor governance record riddled with 
corruption, nepotism, human rights abuses and authoritarian governance. In 2007, it 
was ranked 160/177 on the UNDP Human Development Index and thus qualified as a 
“weak state” 21. In addition, Angola experienced a protracted civil war since attaining 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html, 11 
April 2014 
19 Loc cit 
20 Op. Cit., CIA World Factbook 
21 Loc cit 
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political independence in 1975, which ended in 2002. Botswana did not have a similar 
experience since independence in 1966. However, the Angolan state corporation 
under consideration (Sonangol) remained functional since its establishment in 1976, 
flourishing and expanding into multiple subsidiaries.  
Although the two cases fall under the same analytical category (rich in extractive 
natural resources) different resource sectors are under consideration in this study 
(diamonds for Botswana and oil for Angola.) Though different, the sectors per se are 
not a critical subject of the study but the relationship between political contestation 
and ownership models adopted in the countries’ respective resource management 
companies. Nevertheless, this study shall analyse the political and economic effects 
associated with oil and diamonds and show the extent to which the resources per se 
influenced ownership structures adopted by Botswana and Angola.  
New Institutional Theory 
This study will apply the theory of New Institutionalism to determine the extent to 
which domestic political conditions influenced ownership structures in Angola and 
Botswana. New Institutionalism arose as a rejection of Behaviouralist and Marxist 
approaches to political analysis, which had been leading tools for political analysis 
until the 1970s. Leading New Institutionalists include Huntington (1968), Ekstein 
(1960) and Skocpol (1979). They argued for a return to an examination of how 
institutions affect political outcomes and how different institutional structures in 
different states accounted for different responses to prominent historical episodes, 
such as the 1970s oil crisis and social revolutions in general.22 They also argued that 
“behaviour” is not a sufficient basis for explaining all phenomena of government, 	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since it occurs in the context of institutions and can only be so understood.23 In 
addition, New Institutionalism signalled the return of a state-centred approach, which 
was a departure from behaviourist analysis that focused on patterns of expressed 
human behaviour. Marxism, which exalted the dominance of market forces over the 
state and the rest of a state’s political structure was also questioned.24 Instead, 
institutions, they argue are products of human history and in turn induce particular 
behaviours into a polity; and also consist of rules that govern social interaction and 
for the basis for political behaviour.25  Institutions can be formal or informal, for 
instance the former being constitutionally mandated institutions and the latter 
consisting of cultural norms.  
The main strands of New Institutionalism are sociological, rational choice and 
historical. Sociological Institutionalism is interested in understanding culture and 
norms as institutions in themselves; focusing on patterns of behaviour and cognitive 
maps, and tracing their role in understanding the structure of social, political and 
economic relations.26 Rational Choice Institutionalism borrows from economics, and 
is biased towards employing formal logic and methods to study politics and history. It 
also focuses on basic laws of political behaviour and action, with the intention of 
drawing out observable patterns that can be employed to understand and predict 
political behaviour.27 The Historical Institutional approach focuses on understanding 
and explaining real world events and outcomes, arguing that one cannot explain 
particular historical outcomes without examining the way in which political 
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institutions shaped or structured the political process.28 Institutions, it argues, are 
important intervening/structuring variables through which battles over interests, ideas 
and power are fought.29  Nevertheless, despite these separate intellectual thrusts 
summarised above, these variants of Institutionalism have considerable overlap 
between them.  
This paper will particularly test the extent to which Historical Institutionalism can 
explain the experiences which shaped ownership structures in Angola and Botswana. 
Historical Institutionalism largely draws from Max Weber’s work, and concentrates 
on themes of power and interests. It holds that institutions, demands and policies are 
not shaped by neutral exigencies of modernisation, but by dense interactions among 
economic, social and political actors working according to different logics in different 
contexts.30 Historical Institutionalism also adopts a constructivist disposition in three 
main ways. It is interested in alternative rationalities; whereby individuals and 
communities may develop interpretations of interests and goals that deviate from 
those predicted by means-ends rationality.31 Secondly, it holds that causality is 
contextual; complex political configurations become apparent through historical 
comparative observation and thus it may be difficult to break such models unto 
causally independent variables. Further, Historical Institutionalism emphasises 
contingencies of history; that scholarly understanding of particular events and 
developments is constrained by a large role played by chance, twists of fate and 
accidental combinations that have far reaching effects. These can only be determined 
through historical analysis. 32 In this way, Historical Institutional analysis is an 	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effective tool for analysing and understanding political phenomena in different states 
due to its holistic approach that prioritises historical developments and actors whose 
choices shape current trends.33 
Nevertheless, Historical Institutionalism is criticised on several fronts. For instance, 
due to its tendency to accord history a more logical trajectory and ‘retrospective 
rationality’, it may erroneously portray political developments as tied to institutional 
change and conceiving political choice as intermittent interruptions in path dependent 
frameworks. 34  This retrospective feature increases the likelihood of scholars 
developing “grand narrative” conceptions of political developments at the expense of 
complexities and uncertainties that are inherent in the development of political 
institutions. Also, it minimally accounts for incremental political change, since it 
conceives political developments as a discrete process, characterised by extended 
periods of considerable stability (path dependency) which are only interrupted by 
turbulent formative moments which produce changes to political institutions in 
response to the historical episodes. 35 This approach, called “punctuated equilibrium” 
thus downplays the importance of incremental change caused by subtle deviations in 
the political system. That notwithstanding, Historical Institutionalism is a useful tool 
in analysing political phenomena, to a considerable extent. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
Background to state building in Africa 
In this research, I consider the history of colonial rule as having a foundational effect 
in post-colonial political and economic developments in Africa. The ‘modern’ state in 
Africa is rooted in the history of colonial rule, and since independence, the central 
administrative state has been at the centre of African countries’ political, economic 
and social fortunes. According to Douglass North, although the state is essential for 
economic growth it can be responsible for decline also.36 In determining how the state 
may be either a panacea or anathema for economic growth North juxtaposes contract 
versus predatory perspectives on the state. The contract theory contends that the 
state’s limit on individual’s activity relative to others and protection of collective 
interests is an essential precondition for economic growth. The predatory theory, on 
the other hand considers the state as a tool to further group or class interests by 
preying on the rest of society.37 The predatory state specifies a partial set of property 
rights in favour of the elite at the expense of society at large.38 Therefore, the colonial 
state can be described as having been primarily a predatory state due to it being a tool 
to benefit colonial powers at the expense of indigenous peoples. Policies and 
institutions of colonialism thus laid a foundation for the predatory nature of a 
significant number of post-colonial African states. 
Olson (1993)’s ‘bandit’ allegory can also be applied to describe the founding of the 
colonial state in Africa. He allegorically explains that before the formation of the 
modern state there was uncoordinated theft by ‘bandits’ (which represents militarily 	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powerful individuals or groups in society).39 The bandits were initially ‘roving’ that 
is, they moved around different areas pillaging. It was eventually realised that the 
establishment of a peaceful order would be mutually beneficial for the bandits and 
societies formerly preyed on.40 Instead of uncoordinated theft that impoverished 
vulnerable communities, bandits would instead benefit through a system of revenue 
collection-primarily through taxation to an optimum, equilibrium level (or 
‘rationalised theft’). The bandit would get a continual stream of revenue while the 
community remained with enough resources with which to sustain itself and continue 
to reproduce. In this way, bandits became ‘stationary’ instead of ‘roving’, offering 
security that facilitated economic growth and political stability in such organised 
communities.41 Colonial settlement thus represented stationary banditry, especially in 
settler colonies and roving banditry in non-settler colonies, as elaborated later in this 
chapter. 
Furthermore, Mancur Olson argues  that governments primarily arose out of rational 
self-interest among those with greatest capacity for violence, (that is, the colonial 
powers in Africa).42 He notes that since political elites would stand to lose by preying 
on the communities that would also be their sources of revenue (the rancher versus 
wolf analogy), this necessitated the establishment of an organised system of the 
state. 43  Nevertheless, colonial states were founded for predatory purposes then 
gradually mutated into “stationary banditry” as governance became systemised 
particularly during and after World War 2. They were neither democratic nor 
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concerned with broad based growth. Post-colonial states, as elaborated below have 
often perpetuated such predation due to the prevalence of patrimonial regimes that 
maximise partial at the expense of national benefit., Olson also notes that while self- 
interested leaders lead both dictatorships and democracies in the post-colonial era, 
democracies are the panacea to development because they are more likely to ensure 
the protection of property rights, establish restraints on discretionary authority and 
guarantee basic civil rights and liberties--which have a positive influence on 
economic growth through reducing a country’s “transaction costs”.44  
Since the state in Africa is a product of colonial rule, the legacy of colonial rule 
significantly accounts for challenges to political and economic governance in several 
African countries. Colonial rule was characterised by autocratic political traditions 
and extractive economic systems, which later morphed into more systematised 
administrative structures of ‘direct’ and indirect’ rule from the end of the Second 
World War to the eventual end of colonial rule from the late 1950s to the late 
1980s..45 Colonial state authority primarily rested both on force and other forms of 
routinized subjugation. Although it emphasised the Eurocentric, Westphalian 
conception of state territoriality, it ‘conveniently’ omitted important ethos of 
constitutionalism, liberalism and civil liberties that were pivotal to the construction of 
the ‘nation state’ or a truly modern state in the Weberian sense.46 In addition, the 
colonial state was instrumentally used for economic extraction by a minority of white 
settler elites over a black indigenous majority as alluded to above. As a result, the 
norms, values and institutions of the Western juridical state and democratic ideals 
were not part of the founding stages of the modern state in Africa. At the attainment 	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of political independence, transitions to democracy were swift but the institutional 
shortcomings of colonial rule prevailed.47  
Based on the debate above, it becomes essential to distinguish between settler and 
non-settler colonies in Africa. Settler colonial rule was characterised by higher 
volumes of settler population like South Africa, Kenya and Zambia. They established 
tax regimes, appropriated arable land and created ‘reserves’ for African settlement 
while settlers mostly occupied urban areas.48 Non-settler colonies were characterised 
by lower numbers of settler populations and Africans retained their land ownership 
and production.49 For instance, Botswana was a British non-settler colony, while 
Angola was a Portuguese settler colony. Indigenous political and economic structures 
were mostly undisturbed in non-settler colonies; while they were substantially altered 
in settler colonies. African farmers also retained their land and controlled the 
marketing of their produce in non-settler colonies.50 On the other hand, large-scale 
commercial agriculture and manufacturing grew significantly in settler colonies like 
Zimbabwe and South Africa, driven by artificially low cost of labour from 
dispossessed and heavily taxed African societies.51 All in all, settler colonial regimes 
instituted policies that had far-reaching, negative politico-economic effects that 
reverberated into the post-colonial era, as the comparison between Angola and 
Botswana will show. 
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Crawford Young also notes that although the state embodies normative doctrines of 
sovereignty, territoriality and nationality, in post-colonial Africa it has been shaped 
various social aspects, like class, ethnic and religious formations instead.52  Post-
independence African state bureaucracies typically have a ‘state bourgeoisie’ growing 
around them, whose economic fortunes are tied to the state. Ethnicity mirrors the class 
dimensions that develop from this ‘prebendal’ relationship.53 Nevertheless, several 
states have attempted to cultivate notions of ‘nation building’ that transcend ethnicity 
although ethnic-based political mobilisation is still an enduring feature of postcolonial 
politics that is particularly salient during elections. Consequently, the state, class and 
ethnicity have enduring linkages and account for patterns of political and economic 
developments.  
A key structural factor that binds them together are pervasive patron-client, or 
patrimonial relationships that coagulate around the state. Bratton and van de Walle 
(1994) and Kolstad and Wiig (2009) argue that patrimonial rule is the ‘core and 
distinctive hallmark’ of African post-colonial politics and one of the most definitive 
institutional legacies of colonialism.54 55 Contrary to the Weberian conception of a 
rational state bureaucracy that is independent of influence by social groups, 
personalised clientelist networks between incumbents and their supporters embed 
state organs resulting in corruption, nepotism and personalised rule.56 Bureaucracies 
thus become weak and incapable of functioning with impartiality and 	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professionalism.57  This neopatrimonialism of the modern state is traced back to the 
colonial practice of “indirect rule”. Colonial administration was essentially a patron-
client system, where the central state worked as a tool of extraction and forcible 
domination assisted by local agents (chiefs) enforcing colonial rule at local levels in 
exchange for state funds and protection.58 Apart from enforcing colonial policies on 
behalf of the colonial state, chiefs also managed networks of patronage within their 
locales. This spoils-based system still prevails in the post-colonial era, and results in 
the normalisation of corruption from local to national levels of governance. It is also 
one of the foremost criticisms against the continued incorporation of traditional 
governance within modern democratic systems.  
Closely linked with the above is Jean Jacques Bayart (1993)’s notion of the ‘rhizome 
state.’ This describes the creation of networks of patronage underneath formal 
government institutions; which also extend to the rest of the economy and society at 
large. Bayart notes that both vertical and horizontal ‘rhizomatic’ chains of solidarity 
emerged in most post-colonial African societies. This means that corruption became a 
pervasive cultural norm that continues to affect both private and public sectors, thus 
undermining growth and development on the continent.59 Pervasive institutional 
weakness and consequently dire economic conditions have also tended to increase the 
likelihood of political conflict over access to dwindling economic opportunities. This 
includes ‘cannibalisation’ or theft of organisational assets by employees both in 
government and private sector. Social networks of the rhizome state also reproduce 
and perpetuate social inequality through maintaining unequal distribution of resources 
in the society; because of the marginalisation of those who are not part of the 	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networks of patronage.60 This results in ‘politics of the belly’, where ordinary people 
pursue spoils through such social networks, which results in the normalisation of 
corruption.  
The ‘gatekeeper state’ is another weakness of the post-colonial African states’ 
systems of governance that emanated from colonial rule. According to Frederick 
Cooper, post-colonial African regimes have often relied on the principle of state 
sovereignty, which emphasises the supremacy of territorial borders established during 
colonialism.61 Sovereignty thus becomes a lever for accessing state revenue, primarily 
from outside sources. Like colonial states, their successors had underdeveloped tax 
collection infrastructure. They could not command loyalty and accountability from 
the masses as a result but collected rents at the ‘gate’, or revenue that depended on the 
state’s Westphalian structure; for instance multilateral aid, customs revenue, permits 
and taxes from multinational corporations and visa fees.62 Marketing Boards, which 
are government monopolies compelling cash crop producers to sell their produce to 
them at sub-economic prices, became a key source of revenue for the gatekeeper state. 
This has often been worse where there is substantial extractive natural resource 
revenue. Governments would sell the cash crops – like coffee and cocoa – at the 
world market rate, realise high levels of revenue after having bought the crops from 
farmers at a cheap price and the money would then be used to maintain patron-client 
politics through rewarding allies and annihilating rivals.63  
However, the gatekeeper state is often vulnerable to contending non-state groups and 
thus characterised by violence and contestation. Strategies of undermining the gate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Bayart, Op. Cit, p 228 
61 Cooper, F. (2004). Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p 156 
62 Ibid, p 157 
63 Cooper, Op. Cit, p 159 
	  	  
29	  
include parallel markets, smuggling, tax evasion and perpetual violent struggles for 
control of the state.64 Goldsmith notes that this insecurity of the state leads to high 
political discount rates and short-term horizons.65 High insecurity of political office 
motivates incumbents to steal as much as possible for the sake of self-enrichment and 
supporting a patronage-based system of political support, since the length of their 
tenure is not guaranteed.66 This means that where political leaders are faced with stiff 
challenges to their rule they resort to predation instead of implementing policies for 
broad based economic growth. In addition, leaders who are fearful of being 
prosecuted when they leave office have endeavoured to prolong their tenure beyond 
term limits.67 Therefore, political patronage has a double-pronged result of making the 
state the locus of violence while undermining its ability for broad based distribution 
of public goods as well.   
However, colonialism was not a point of fundamental transformation and did not 
eradicate pre-colonial traditions for the modern state models to be fully established 
after independence.68 The modern state in Africa was not properly institutionalised 
and established as a distinct entity from society and thus will not entirely conform to 
Western notions of political modernity. Instead, the colonial state was primarily an 
instrument of extraction and domination, not inculcation of new political and 
governmental norms and values/culture. Paradoxically, the personalisation and 
informalisation of politics seen during colonialism conformed to established African 
practices not the western model.69 As a result, patron-client politics remain a feature 	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of African pre-colonial politics both within modern state institutions and rural social 
relations. The post-colonial state is thus vacuous and ineffectual because it was not in 
African elites’ interests to develop effective western models because the patrimonial 
state serves their interests. The supremacy of institutions disempowers politicians who 
rely on patronage for political power and survival. In light of this argument, patron-
client relations are an enduring social phenomenon in African societies to a 
considerable extent; they are analogous to corruption in one context and are a strong 
cultural feature of society in another.  
The paradox of plenty in sub-Saharan Africa 
Challenges to natural resource management are thus rooted in post-colonial state 
pathologies discussed above, to a considerable extent. The “resource curse” 
hypothesis, which explains the negative correlations between resource endowment 
and political and economic development in Africa emanates from a 1995 study 
conducted by Sachs & Warner.70 A statistical study of African countries rich in fuel 
and extractive mineral resources between 1971-1989 showed a negative relationship 
between resource wealth and economic growth.71 This was caused by the states’ 
failure to effect economic diversification, or the ‘Dutch disease syndrome’, where 
non-rent generating economic sectors were neglected and degenerated. Governments’ 
failure to maintain savings also led to the dissipation of incomes. Thus the 
combination of the presence of natural resources, poor macro-economic policies, high 
public expenditure and low savings rates resulted in underdevelopment.72 Commodity 
price volatility also weakened resource rich economies, thus making them vulnerable 
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to cyclical booms and busts. High poverty rates which resulted from weak global 
commodity prices tended to result in conditions that led to political violence. 
 
High resource rents have also often discouraged governments from developing state 
institutional infrastructure to avoid being accountable to the public regarding how 
they spent the revenue. Commonly referred to as ‘rent seeking,’ or the ‘rentier state’, 
the presence of high rents increases the likelihood of authoritarian, unaccountable and 
predatory governance.73 Negotiations for exploration and/or management of resource 
rents bypass national mechanisms of the state, like the legislature are conducted 
between multinational corporations and political elites.74 The state thus becomes 
‘detached’ from the masses and marginalizes social groups that fall outside 
patrimonial networks. Countries that do not have such high rent-generating mineral 
resources, on the other hand tend to develop political and economic capacity to 
sustain viable per capita incomes.75 This is because they would have to rely on tax 
revenue, which necessitates being accountable to the “taxpayer”, or the masses and 
various economic activities that would create national wealth, like agriculture. This 
aptly describes Botswana’s situation when it attained political independence in 1966. 
The concentration of incomes on the state thus increases the value of being in 
government, leading to the culture of zero-sum or winner-take-all politics and other 
pathologies described earlier in the paper.76  
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Furthermore, natural resource-related political instability can also be attributed to the 
end of the Cold War. The end of proxy wars led to the withdrawal of aid from various 
armed groups who had benefitted from war-related funding channels; and the need to 
secure alternative funding mechanisms for such non-state militants led to reliance on 
natural resources.77 Additional factors contributing to conflict over natural resources 
also include the type of natural resource, and politics of ownership, management and 
control. For instance, diamonds feature prominently in African conflicts due to their 
lootability, high profit margins and global demand. “Warlords” mobilise communities 
to fight for a particular cause, either using charisma or appealing to various notions of 
grievances against the state. They also appeal to ethnic linkages for recruitment and 
mobilisation, and use direct coercion as well. This explains the prominence of child 
soldiers in several intra-African wars. Warlords also develop and rely on complex 
networks for the sale of natural resources, arms procurement, protection rackets and 
relationships with multinational corporations. 78  This describes Angola’s UNITA 
rebels, as elaborated in Chapter 4. Rebels and warlords can thus be regarded as 
‘rational entrepreneurs of violence’ who use various strategies to maximise benefits 
from resource-based wars. This often makes rebellion a ‘quasi-criminal’ activity with 
a private gain imperative, and natural resources—especially diamonds have been 
frequently cited as the reason for the protracted nature of African civil wars. 
 
In addition, high levels of political contestation in resource and non-resource rich 
states has often resulted in negative outcomes due to strategic considerations by 
political incumbents to diminish chances of having autonomous actors within their 
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territories. Where they face high political contestation, they deliberately reduce 
opportunities for economic diversification and maintain revenue concentration at the 
centre. For example, Suharto’s regime in Indonesia faced high political contestation 
from the opposition he empowered the economically powerful but politically weak 
Chinese businessmen, which led to economic growth and diversification but limited 
chances of political defeat. 79 In Zaire, on the other hand Mobutu’s insecurity due to 
militarised contestation led to a deliberate policy of poor road infrastructural 
development in order to limit armed groups’ access to Kinshasa; and also established 
a policy of Zaireanisation in order to support patronage networks.80 This can be 
described as “structured contingency”, where political leaders make strategies to 
maintain political rule contributes to the negative outcomes with resources wealth, 
including the ownership structures that they subsequently choose. Nevertheless, 
contrary to the above, Botswana’s ruling party (BDP) established a 50-50 partnership 
with De Beers, which has sustained its stable diamond income to date. The BDP has 
neither faced military nor formidable democratic political contestation, winning 
elections since independence in 1966.  
 
Furthermore, the “greed and grievance” hypothesis is another influential theory 
linking natural resources to conflict. Collier & Hoeffler (2004) argue that conflict in 
natural resource-rich states largely lies in economic incentives and driven by greed. 81 
When greed for economic gain coexists with grievances in primary export dependent 
states, rebellions become an attractive course of action and usually adopt a typically 
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criminal disposition. Grievances are made more likely by social inequalities and 
political exclusion. Thus the ‘silent force of greed’ employs the ‘loud discourse of 
grievance’ to wage war for control of natural resources.82 As alluded to earlier, 
religion and ethnicity become readily instrumental tools for rousing support from 
marginalised societies. These are also used to raise funds from external resources, 
such as sympathetic supporters in the diaspora.83 In addition, “grievances are to a 
rebel movement what image is to a business,” which means that the ideology of 
grievance becomes an effective tool for masking the criminal intentions of rebellion. 
War becomes the ‘continuation of business by other means.’84 Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004) thus suggest that economic growth is the best preventative measure against 
violence in resource rich countries. As a country’s per capita income doubles, the 
likelihood of conflict drops by half.85 Thus, a stronger economy coupled with a strong 
state diminishes the ability of rebel groups to recruit and sustain conflicts in resource 
rich countries. 
 
Comparing oil and diamonds 
Nevertheless, the linkages between resources and adverse outcomes may be nuanced 
by considering the influences of geography, spatiality, the type of natural resource 
and method of extraction. Le Billon (2008) notes that the accessibility of minerals 
determines the extent to which they can (or can not) incentivise violence.86 “Diffused” 
minerals, such as alluvial diamonds that are susceptible to illicit mining, attract large 
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numbers of irregular miners, easier to smuggle and this makes violence more likely.87 
“Point source” minerals such as platinum and “kimberlitic” diamonds, which require 
specialised techniques of extraction and capital, do not attract as many actors as 
alluvial diamonds, thus necessitating corporate and state control. Furthermore, the 
natural resources’ location, coupled with their accessibility and location can shape 
various political and economic outcomes. The farther the resources are from a 
country’s political centre, the more difficult they would be to control. For example, 
secessionist movements may occur when the resource is located in a country’s 
peripheral region. Sierra Leone’s diamonds, for example were located in the South 
East, which is remote from Freetown and at the border with Liberia and this 
substantially accounts for the government’s failure to control artisanal miners, their 
external patrons and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) incursion that targeted 
diamond rich areas from the outset.88  
 
Oil is usually associated with adverse outcomes because it is the world’s largest 
traded commodity, and an essential component of modern economies--especially in 
highly industrialised countries.89 Apart from causing political conflict, the presence of 
oil often results in authoritarian regimes and centralisation of oil revenues in the 
central state.90 Examples include Nigeria, Angola, oil producers in the Middle East 
and, Sudan and Chad. Ross (2001) also argues that oil has substantially anti-
democratic properties due to its capital-intensive nature and this occurs through the 
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three main mechanisms of rentier, repression and anti-modernisation effects. 91 
Nevertheless, other oil producers such as Norway and Canada neither have 
authoritarian regimes, weak economies nor authoritarian regimes, which means that 
oil in itself does not spur negative outcomes but these occur within a broader 
domestic and international context.92 This may include state weakness, and the 
presence of local and external belligerents. In addition, the location of the oil 
influences peculiar outcomes. Le Billon argues that countries that have offshore oil 
exploitation conflict tend to be less likely to experience conflict than those dependent 
on onshore extraction.93 However, the case of Angola negates this claim since civil 
war occurred despite having offshore oil deposits. 
 
Nevertheless, causal mechanisms between natural resources and adverse outcomes 
remain circumstantial and circuitous. 94 It is imperative to analyse the dynamic 
interactions between the presence of natural resources and governance within a 
particular historical and structural context that focuses on political and economic 
governance.95 Governance is primarily concerned with the exercise of power. It is 
defined as the manner in which political power is exercised in the management of a 
country’s economic and social resources for developmental outcomes.96 Elements of 
national governance that determine the success or failure of resource rich countries 
mainly include territorial factors, laws and constitutional factors, enforcement 	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capacity, institutional and cultural practices and the ratification of global treaties.97 
However, governance is shaped by various internal and external factors, and this 
study thus focuses on the linkages between domestic political conditions and the 
governance of natural resources.  
 
An overview of ownership structures  
Luong and Weinthal (2006) hold that research focus should only be placed not on the 
‘paradox of plenty’, but ownership models in the management of natural resources.98 
An intermediary cause of institutional weakness often ignored is the structure of 
ownership over resources, and this is rooted not in resource wealth per se but 
domestic conditions that precede resource development.99 Particularly, the centralised 
control of resource wealth by the state is usually associated with slow economic 
growth and state pathologies indicated earlier in the paper, while revenue dispersion is 
more likely to facilitate positive developmental outcomes. Specifically, the inclusion 
of more domestic non-state actors in resource management creates conditions that 
increase the likelihood of more efficient and transparent management of resource 
revenue. Ownership structures are thus critical because they create peculiar incentives 
for institution building, define the primary actors involved and determine the nature of 
business-state relations, and consequently, developmental outcomes in the 
management of natural resources.100 
 
The three basic ownership models extant in most resource rich states can be 
categorised as state ownership with control, where political elites and bureaucrats are 	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the main actors in resource management. It usually leads to blurred and asymmetrical 
business-state relations, with a higher likelihood of discretionary power and control 
by political elites.101 Secondly, private domestic ownership is where the main actors 
in resource management are state elites and domestic owners, with business and state 
relations being clear and symmetrical. Incentives for the establishment of strong 
institutions are more likely under this model.102 State ownership without control and 
private foreign ownership is the third category, and this is where the main actors are 
state elites and foreign investors. In this case, business-state relations are likely clear 
and asymmetrical, with institutions that may be effective in the short run but unstable 
for long-term development being likely created.103 This is mostly due to the mobile 
and detached nature of external investors, who are seldom interested in the host 
country’s long-term development especially in the extractive industry. 
 
Private domestic ownership models are regarded as the most preferable, since they 
entail the participation of invested local business actors. Strong fiscal and regulatory 
institutions are more likely to emerge under private domestic ownership primarily 
because of the participation of local actors who have a mutual interest in establishing 
formal guarantees that will ensure fiscal predictability and reduce transaction and 
monitoring costs. 104  However, private domestic ownership models are rare in 
developing countries because domestic conditions that support it, such as a well-
developed indigenous industrial sector, high level of alternative export revenue and 
high level of political contestation are either absent or ineffective.105 Ownership 
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structures that countries adopt in managing natural resource wealth are thus dependant 
on domestic constraints political leaders face when mineral wealth is first discovered 
or when the country attained independent statehood. Given the above, negative 
outcomes commonly associated with resource wealth are thus intimately attributed to 
pathologies associated with state ownership.  
 
State ownership with control has thus been the most prominent form of ownership in 
post-colonial African countries. This was also rooted in centralised colonial rule, 
where Marketing Boards or state parastatals directly managed the most productive 
economic sectors, whether agriculture or extractive natural resources. 106  Most 
importantly, where natural resources were discovered and extracted prior to the 
attainment of political independence, the state monopolised the management of 
resource revenue and this persisted in the post-colonial era through parastatals, or 
public corporations. However, parastatals are not unique to Africa, with Russia, China 
and the Middle East’s petro-states for instance also having state led monopolistic 
corporations operating with varying levels of autonomy.107 State corporations are 
typically associated with corruption, inefficient management, nepotism, low levels of 
productivity and generally poor quality of service or products.108 Although state 
involvement is often argued to be essential in developing countries because it can act 
as a stable institutional owner that may underwrite financial risk for long-term 
profitability; and also espouses social, as opposed to private profit making goals, the 
record of state involvement in the resource sector in African countries is 
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predominantly poor.109  This is also based on the types of political systems developed 
after independence, and this shall be explored below. 
 
Political regimes and contestation  
There is a reciprocal relationship between political contestation and the types of 
government in sub-Saharan Africa. The common distinction made in defining 
political regimes is usually democratic versus dictatorship or authoritarian rule. This 
and other finer distinctions made (elaborated below) have classical intellectual roots. 
For instance, Montesquieu emphasised the distinction between “limited” and 
“despotic regimes”, Rousseau and Kant distinguished between “autonomous 
systems”, where rules and norms are made by those to whom they apply, and 
“heteronomous systems”, where law makers are distinct from those subject to laws. 110 
Schumpeter emphasised “competition” as essential for good governance, which was 
synonymous with Dahl’s reference to “contestation” as essential for democratic 
governance.111 Contestation can be said to be present in a political system when the 
opposition that exists that has the potential to successfully take over political office 
either through elections or force. In democratic systems, political contestation causes 
uncertainty, irreversibility and repeatability, and this ideally ought to influence 
accountability in political leadership. 112  In authoritarian systems, contestation 
primarily causes uncertainty and insecurity; since political competition would often 
exist in the form of zero sum violence. This usually leads to more repressive methods 
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of political control in order to minimise incumbents’ chances of being removed from 
power.  
 
Wiggel (2008) defines political regimes as authoritarian, electoral-autocratic, 
constitutional-oligarchic and democratic. 113  Authoritarian regimes neither hold 
elections, nor provide basic constitutional guarantees, rights or liberties. This can also 
be called a “closed hegemony.”114  Electoral – autocratic regimes have minimal 
electoral freedoms, such as an independent electoral agency. This may also be 
regarded as “populist autocracy”, where the political system is primarily used to 
rubber stamp dictatorial rule, for instance Venezuela under Hugo Chavez. Thirdly, 
constitutional-oligarchic regimes often fulfil minimal constitutional provisions, 
although elections are usually flawed. This is also referred to as “liberal-oligarchic, ” 
where electoral conditions guarantee repeated victories for a single party. 115 
Democratic regimes fulfil both constitutional and electoral conditions, and are also 
referred to as liberal democracies, such as the United States. Given this typology, 
Angola fits the “authoritarian” category, and Botswana can be regarded as a liberal-
oligarchic, or as a dominant-party system due to the BDP’s electoral dominance since 
independence in 1966. This has however not negatively influenced its resource 
management policies, as will be elaborated in Chapter 4. 
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Fig. 2: Wiggel’s typology of regime types116 
 
Democracy and democratic contestation in Africa 
Democracy is defined and described in various ways that reflect its classical 
philosophical origins and core features. The openness of the political system and 
primacy of participation by the masses are some of the most prominent tenets. For 
instance, Bachrach defines it as a system of governance that is mandated with the 
‘self-development’ of each individual in the polity.117 Dahl defines democracy as a 
system that is “almost entirely responsible to its citizens”, emphasising competition 
and participation as the core of democratic politics.118  Schumpeter defines it as a 
system whereby holders of public office are selected through periodic elections in 
which candidates freely compete for votes with a universal adult franchise.119 This is 
contrary to competing perspectives such as Elite Theory and Marxism. For instance, 
Elite Theory describes a system where oligarchic minorities whose interests trump 
those of the masses dominate the political system, and Marxist Theory emphasises the 
instrumental and structural nature of the state, with economic elites (bourgeoisie) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Loc cit 
117 Huntington, S.P. (1997).  “After twenty years: The future of the Third Wave” Journal of Democracy 
8, 4, p 195 
118 Loc cit 
119 Loc cit  
	  	  
43	  
manipulating the state to fulfil self-seeking market-based objectives.120 In this way, 
democracy is seen as the ideal and most supreme model of governance that is an 
antidote to such socio-political pathologies that Elite and Marxist theories 
hypothesise. 
 
Elections, the rule of law, separation of powers and civil society are democracy’s 
main institutional features. Elections are the primary channel of participation, 
contestation and granting of legitimacy to hold public office.  They ought to be 
regular, free, fair and competitive in order to be credible.121 In practice however, 
electoral results are not always immune from manipulation both in established and 
developing democracies. Manipulation ranges from the parties having disparate 
amounts of resources, access to the media, bias by electoral agencies and zoning 
irregularities. As a result, democracies can be regarded as being distinctly “electoral” 
or “liberal”. Liberal democracies hold regular elections, exercise sufficient restraints 
on the power of the executive, have independent judiciaries, protect individual 
liberties and the rights of minority groups.122  Electoral democracies, on the other 
hand establish governments through elections, which may be considered free and fair, 
but exist without the above-mentioned features of liberal democracy--particularly 
individual rights and liberties. For instance, Freedom House’s 2014 global report 
ranks 45% countries as free, 30% as partly free and 25% as not free.123 Therefore, 
elections do not always guarantee the consolidation of the core tenets of democracy 
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mainly because of political elites’ aversion to the strengthening of democracy in order 
to consolidate political power. 
 
Furthermore, the three main types of electoral regimes are categorised as facilitating 
plural, majority or proportional representation. Plural models, or “first past the post”, 
are the most common in developing countries. They are based on territorially 
demarcated single member constituencies, with a candidate or party getting the 
greater number of winning votes in one round of voting despite the proportion of 
votes gained not constituting a majority.124 Secondly, majority representation entails a 
candidate’s electoral victory being determined by winning more than 50% of votes 
cast. This is a slight alteration of the first past the post system. Proportional 
representation treats the state as a single constituency, and this can be categorised as 
“single-transferrable vote” and “party list” systems.125 Single transferrable systems of 
voting stress personal rather than territorial aspects, with a candidate obtaining a 
quota of votes approximate to the number of votes cast and divided by the number of 
seats to be filled. Party list is where each competing party receives a specific 
percentage of seats proportional to the number of votes gained in an election.126 In 
this way, all political parties that participate in the election are guaranteed seats in the 
legislature and votes are not “wasted”, as a result.127  
 
Another essential tenet of democracy is the rule of law, which entails the supremacy 
of the constitution, equality before the law, due legal processes and its predictability. 
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The rule of law guarantees the protection of civil and political liberties that are 
enshrined in the constitution. It also supports the economy through the reduction of 
transaction costs and guaranteeing of property rights, which are essential for creating 
an environment conducive for investments and economic growth. 128 The separation 
of powers between the executive, judiciary and legislative arms of the state is another 
primary institutional feature of democracy. Ideally, relative autonomy between these 
three core institutions of the state results in checks and balances, thus diminishing 
chances of biased outcomes. Also, the civil society is democracy’s key mediating 
institution. It operates independently between the masses and the state, functioning as 
a major tool for articulating the popular will, influencing state policies and giving 
birth to political parties as well.129 Civil society groups can also rise out of ethnic, 
religious, ideological or class groups. For instance, during the latter years of colonial 
rule most nationalist groups across sub-Saharan Africa grew out of Marxist-oriented 
unions, which initially aimed at improving indigenous workers’ conditions but 
gradually mutated into full-fledged anti-colonial campaigners and political parties. 
 
Furthermore, the four main conditions under which democracy can flourish are the 
level of economic wealth, social structure, external influences and cultural context.130 
A “very high correlation” between levels of economic development and democracy 
explains why most poor countries struggle with democracy, and most developed ones 
have relatively more robust systems.131 Lipset also argues that capitalist and free 
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market economies are essential for democracies to thrive.132 Economic development 
contributes to the improvement of education and urbanisation levels, which increases 
the likelihood of citizen participation. Most importantly, it leads to the growth of a 
middle class/bourgeoisie that is invested in the way they are governed. It also spawns 
industrialisation, which gives rise to unionism, political party formation and growth of 
civil society. 133  Development also produces resources for national distribution, 
diminishing chances of politics degenerating into a zero-sum competition for little 
resources. It also creates multiple actors and centres of power within the polity, which 
the state may not be able to control and who counterbalance its ‘relative 
autonomy.’134  
 
A country’s social structure also influences patterns of democratisation. A 
‘differentiated’ social structure with relatively autonomous social classes, regional 
groups and professional organisations provides the basis for the limitation of sate 
power.135 As highlighted above, the bourgeoisie constitutes a well-resourced social 
group invested in political governance, through supplying candidates for political 
office or speaking out regarding various political issues as individuals or foundations 
and civic interest groups. On the other hand, ethnically homogenous polities (like 
Swaziland, for instance) that may have traditional monarchies instead of rational-legal 
democratic systems tend to experience flawed to none democratic systems. In 
addition, a society’s receptiveness to democracy rests on local cultural factors. 
Culture can be defined as a set of beliefs, expressive symbols and values that define 
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the situation in which political action takes place.136  Where the local culture supports 
the tenets and dynamics of democracy, it will flourish, but when dominant aspects of 
culture, like religion (such as predominantly Muslim countries) it may not be 
sustained. 
 
Violent Political Contestation in Africa 
In African postcolonial states, political violence has often been a ubiquitous feature, 
with varying levels of intensity in different countries.137 It occurs in various contexts, 
primarily as civil wars or through elections. Electoral violence in Africa occurs 
before, during or after elections and it is usually characterised by voter intimidation, 
destruction of political parties’ campaign materials, arrest, imprisonment, physical 
attacks and assassination of political candidates and attacks on political parties’ 
offices.138 The most notable examples include Nigeria in 2003 and 2007, Lesotho in 
1998 and 2007, Kenya in 2007 and Zimbabwe in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2008.139 
Electoral violence can be categorised as low or high intensity, and it is essentially 
instrumentalised as a mode of competition, rationally employed to weaken political 
opponents.140 Causes of electoral violence are varied and complex, but largely caused 
by the nature of the country’s transition from colonialism to independence, social 
cleavages, quality of the state’s monopoly over violence, perceived legitimacy of the 
electoral process and the nature and organisational capacity of political parties.141  	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To elaborate, militarised transitions to political independence have been associated 
with political violence due to residual effects, such as armed militia who attack at the 
bidding of contending political elites, and an entrenched culture of using violence as a 
means of arbitration. Social cleavages, especially religious and ethnic tend to be used 
for political mobilisation by political elites. Ethnic groups can also act as relatively 
autonomous structures that can undermine state capacity, or become an alternative to 
a weak or collapsed state that cannot supply public goods.142 A weak state security 
apparatus also fails to neutrally mediate violent contestation between non-state 
groups, thus making violence likely. The form and nature of political parties also 
determines their predilection for violence. For instance, formerly militarised 
nationalist movements, such as ZANU PF in Zimbabwe maintain “struggle 
discourse”, branding all forms of political opposition as an “affront to national 
interests” and thus deserving violent confrontation and elimination. Therefore, 
political violence is usually a result of pre-existing conditions that are peculiar to the 
post-colonial African context, and elections are located within these power relations.  
 
In addition, political violence is indicative of deep-set institutional weaknesses and 
failure of state building.143 A key pre-condition for democracy to flourish is a viable 
state. The state is a body politic, or a set of administrative institutions that claim a 
legitimate command over a bounded territory.144 A viable state also has legitimate 
monopoly over violence, and is able to provide public goods that reinforce its 	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legitimacy as a delegated authority established by popular will. Democracy is a form 
of a governance system of a state, so there is need for consolidation of state 
institutions prior to democracy.145 Introducing elections prior to the securing of a 
legitimate, stable political order is “democratising backwards”, and this has been 
African states’ experience. 146  
 
In comparison, “first wave” or advanced Western democracies developed basic 
institutions of a state before universal suffrage was granted; thus they democratised 
forwards. On the other hand, the emphasis on having elections without institutions of 
strong state institutions in Africa largely accounts for the prevalence of violent 
political contestation. Leaders in new democracies would have a double challenge of 
constructing modern state institutions while competing with other non-state actors.147 
In light of this fact, sequential reform that entails building institutions of a Weberian 
state model and a developed economy would need to precede democratisation.148 
Examples include East Asian states such as South Korea which developed long 
traditions of strong states with merit based bureaucracies prior to liberalising its 
political and economic systems.149 Therefore, the strategy of promoting elections at 
the expense of state building in Africa was simplistic and proved to be ineffective.150 
This accounts for the predominantly violent political contestation that has 
characterised both resource and non-resource rich countries in Africa. 
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Furthermore, the idea that democracy in Africa could be an externally driven exercise 
was not inductively reached by monitoring trends in political development on the 
continent, but deductively, through theories and experiences of other (mostly 
Western) countries.151 African conditions may not be conducive for the successful 
implementation of democracy in its classical, Western form, and the same goes for 
socialist systems that have equally failed to grow on the continent—such as 
Tanzania’s experience, for instance.152  While formal institutions are relatively easy to 
establish, socio-economic structures that determine the extent to which they will work 
are more difficult to create. African political systems can thus be described as 
‘peculiar hybrids’, because they are typically both patrimonial, which is an aspect of 
“traditional” governance, and also possessing aspects of a modern Weberian state.153 
Therefore, the process of building democracy in Africa ought to begin from the state-
centre and as an endogenous project, with minomal external involvement. 154 The 
imposition of externally generated ideologies of governance onto African political 
systems, while negating existing socio economic and political patterns will undermine 
the development of endogenous democratic systems155.  
 
Nevertheless, African states show a record of growth of institutional rules and gradual 
displacement of violence as a means of arbitration.156 Since the advent of the 3rd wave 
of democratisation in 1990, elections have become a more important mechanism for 
selecting leaders and growth is evident both in the number and quality of 
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competitiveness. For example, between 1960-1970 there was an average of 28 
elections, which grew to 36 in 1980s, and 65 in the 1990s.157 Between 2000-2005, 41 
elections were held, and this increased frequency of elections also saw incumbents 
being challenged by more than one opposition political party. Dominant parties are 
however a common feature, for instance South Africa’s African National Congress 
(ANC), Namibia’s South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO), Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP) and Zimbabwe African National Party (ZANU PF). This 
results in elections adopting a “liberal Machiavellian nature”, with the entrenchment 
of a single political party’s dominance and a weak, fragmented opposition. 158  
Although incumbents win almost always, they have still managed to extend their 
power through formal institutional channels rather than extra constitutional means.159 
For instance, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, in power since 1980 has remained thus 
through elections, although he is a de facto authoritarian ruler. On the other hand, 
Botswana’s ruling party (BDP) has been in power since 1966 but has peacefully 
changed leaders four times since then, through relatively free and fair elections. 
 
However, despite improvements with electoral democracies, political contestation has 
also adopted militarised forms in post-colonial African states. This, as mentioned 
earlier has been a result of the existence of non-state armed groups within African 
states. Military contestation is rooted in Cold War proxy wars, for instance in 
Zimbabwe, South Africa and Angola. Nationalist groups that transformed into 
military groups, particularly in the 1970s have morphed into the dominant governing 
parties alluded to above. In these countries, political independence and transition to 
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democracy occurred as a result of military conflict. Examples include Zimbabwe’s 
ZANLA and ZIPRA, ANCs Umkonto weSizwe and Angola’s MPLA and UNITA. As 
mentioned above, due to the zero sum nature of post-colonial African politics, 
military violence has remained a part of post-colonial political contestation and 
arbitration. This is worsened by the existence of high rent generating extractive 
natural resources such as diamonds and oil, since control of the state translates to 
access to resource revenue.  
 
This violence has often resulted in significant numbers of African rulers opting out of 
territorially bounded state structures.160 Political incumbents have often employed 
non-state actors, like mercenaries and foreign contractors to provide security and 
perform services formerly run by state bureaucracies. Incumbent African rulers face 
incessant threats from strongmen, or “warlords”, particularly those belonging to social 
groups marginalised from patron-client networks. The creation of enclaves within 
such states by warlords is thus designed to undercut incumbents' influence, undermine 
state sovereignty, weaken bureaucracies and cause conflict. Sierra Leone and Angola 
are key examples where rebel groups created “states within states”, which was also 
supported by the presence of natural resources, primarily diamonds..161 It has thus 
often become difficult to separate private power and state power in some contexts; 
since incumbent statesmen employ various non-state and trans-state networks to 
provide privatised security and administrative services normally reserved for the state.  
 
In addition, as alluded to earlier most rulers faced increased insecurity following the 
Cold War. While non-state political rivals function in informal networks, which give 	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them access to weapons and other resources, incumbents have often faced limits from 
bureaucratic institutions of the state, which increased their sense of insecurity.162 In 
Sierra Leone for instance, both President Momoh and Valentine Strasser outsourced 
military and revenue collection services, from companies such as Executive 
Outcomes and Specialist Services International respectively.163 Both leaders faced 
insecurity from their own armies and from the RUF rebel group.  Mercenaries were 
thus preferred due to their loyalty and inability to build independent power bases. 
State weakness thus causes uncertainty and insecurity for African leaders, causing a 
reordering of institutional configurations of the state. In such a scenario, natural 
resources have often driven this state of dysfunctional statehood and militarised 
political contestation. 
 
Nevertheless, Thandika Mkandawire argues that political violence is not peculiar to 
Africa, and neither rooted in its cultural practices, like neo-patrimonialism nor driven 
by greed of economic incentives alone. 164   He disagrees with the economic 
explanations given by scholars like Collier and Hoeffler – that poverty is a key 
determinant and push factor for violence – and rational choice theories which argue 
that rebels are self interested actors employing deliberate, systematic violent acts to 
achieve various objectives.165  Instead, postcolonial rebel movements usually stem 
from urban-based grievances, such as youth unemployment that cannot be expressed 
in urban areas where the state has a greater monopoly over violence. As a result, the 
violence spills over to the rural areas where rebel groups establish parallel spheres of 	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control. These issues are often a result of ethnic and economic marginalisation, and 
this tends to be worse in resource rich but poorly governed states.166  Thus, political 
violence is usually based on structural conditions that need to be investigated through 
holistic, context based and root-cause based analyses.  
 
Furthermore, resource scarcity can also induce political violence in post-colonial 
African countries. 167  Scarcity can be supply induced, where environmental 
degradation and resource depletion leads to increased competition for little resources; 
or demand induced, where excessive consumption and pressure on the environment 
increases due to population growth for example; and structurally induced, where 
unequal social distribution of resources and concentration in the hands of relatively 
few people, while the majority struggle with poverty, results in conflict.168 The 
hardships result in grievance formulation and articulation, that lead to increased 
demands on the state. Chances of conflict escalate where a breakdown in channels of 
communication between the masses and the state occurs. The likelihood of violence 
also increases when non-state groups with strong collective identities and an 
opportunity to successfully challenge the state also exist. Ethnicity can also be a 
causal factor in this regard, especially as a mobilization tool since it is the most 
readily available form of group identification and allegiance. This can happen through 
‘primordial’ or ‘instrumental’ mechanisms. Primordialism emphasises the affective, 
cultural bases of ethnic identities and allegiances.169 Instrumentalism, on the other 
hand focuses on how ethnic identities are manipulated to garner political benefits and 	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objectives. Political elites in weak democracies thus tend to instrumentally manipulate 
primordial attachments. This can become acute where extractive mineral resources 
abound since they enable non-state groups to acquire arms and other material 
resources to challenge the state.  
 
Given the discussion above, various factors underlie the nature of violent and non-
violent political contestation in post-colonial Africa, and this in turn shapes specific 
ownership models established in resource rich countries. Although most governments 
adopted democratic systems after the end of colonial rule, they have not always been 
consolidated and sustained in their normative forms. The presence of natural 
resources creates incentives for centralised state control, and the state frequently 
becomes the locus of political contestation since controlling the state translates to 
having direct access to resource revenue. This also leads to centralised ownership 
models that marginalise other social groups, thus creating zero-sum competition for 
control of either the state or the resource sector or both. Nevertheless, cases like 
Botswana deviate from this common “resource curse” trajectory, thus showing the 
need for nuanced approaches that show the interplay of domestic political conditions 
and the management of natural resources. Therefore, these debates shall be considered 
through the comparative analysis of the cases of Angola and Botswana, elaborated in 
Chapter 4 below. 
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Chapter 4: Case Study Presentation 
Angola and Botswana: An Overview 
Botswana is one of the world’s foremost success stories as far as economic and 
political governance is concerned. Upon attaining political independence in 1966, 
Botswana was one of the poorest countries in the world. For example, it had poor 
infrastructure and no paved roads (save for 10km of tarred road) and only two 
secondary schools built in the 1940s existed170. The schools could only accommodate 
up to 80 students a year, whereas Zambia, for instance could accommodate 10 times 
this number, while Uganda could manage 70 times this figure.171 As a result, 
Botswana had a 25% literacy rate. Furthermore, 50% of government expenditure at 
independence was financed from Britain, with cattle ranching being the only viable 
economic activity.172 In addition, 90% of the population lived in poverty, with $60 per 
capita income. Agriculture was one of the core economic sectors, which accounted for 
40% of its GDP.173  
 
However, Botswana managed to develop its economy to impressive growth rates 
since then. For instance, it had per capita income of $5796 in 1998, which was almost 
four times the African average at the time. Between 1965 and 1998, the economy 
grew at 7.7%.174 In 2001, real per capita income was pegged at $7820 and this was 
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nearly twice as high as the average East Asian Tigers’ per capita income of $3854.175 
Although it still experiences several economic, social and political challenges, its 
economic growth and political stability have been relatively impressive compared to 
other resource rich sub-Saharan African countries. Its relative success can be 
explained in part by the nature of its colonial transition, the role of post-colonial 
elites’ policy choices, relationship with the world’s largest diamond cartel (De Beers) 
and the creation of strong institutions upon which its economic stability is founded.  
 
Angola, on the other experienced divergent outcomes. Since it was a Portuguese 
colony, the 1974 revolution in Portugal came at a time when the country was a 
tinderbox of militarised anti-colonial violence. The MPLA, UNITA (National Union 
for the Total Independence of Angola) and FNLA (National Liberation Front of 
Angola) were the country’s main nationalist groups. Once Portugal granted political 
independence in 1975, the groups began fighting for control of the state176. Although 
MPLA eventually prevailed over the other two organisations and became 
internationally recognised as the legitimate government of Angola, the subsequent 
protracted civil war running from 1975-2002 undermined the development of strong 
political institutions in the country. In addition, Angola was the theatre of a Cold War 
proxy war that involved several external actors, including the United States, Cuba, 
South Africa and the DRC (then Zaire). While the Angolan economy had been vibrant 
and relatively diversified during the terminal stages of colonial rule, the adoption of 
Marxist-Leninist ideology by the MPLA is generally credited with causing gradual 
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economic decline and eventual dependence on natural resource revenue177. However, 
the creation of Sonangol in 1976 and its subsequent growth is one of the greatest 
marvels of Angola’s history. The company was MPLA’s political project, created and 
competently managed in order to generate rents for sustaining the war effort and 
primary revenue source for the government 178 . The company is the sole oil 
concessionaire, regulator, tax collector and manager of revenue on behalf of the 
Angolan state179. 
 
Angola: Political Contestation and the Formation of Sonangol  
Historical Overview 
Angola is a former Portuguese colony, with the colonial incursion dating back to the 
late 1480s but formally established after the 1884-85 Berlin Conference. Although 
Angola was a settler colony, the Portuguese settler population was fairly small, with 
approximately 340 000 being recorded at independence in November 1975. The 
settler population grew from the early 1950s, with increased migration from Portugal 
by both peasant and entrepreneurial classes. Although indigenous communities such 
as the ethnic Ovimbundu and Bakongo communities revolted in 1913 and 1917, the 
nationalist movement for political independence only commenced in earnest in 
1961.180  Like other European powers in Africa, the Portuguese colonial state had an 
extractive imperative in Angola, collecting rents primarily through taxation, forced 
plantation labour and the export of cash crops such as cotton and coffee.181 It also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Loc cit 
178 de Oliveria, Op cit 
179 Loc cit 
180 Meijer, G and Birmingham, D. (2004). “From military peace to social justice? The Angolan peace 
process.” Conciliation Resources, Online:  http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/angola-past-present.  
Accessed 10 March 2015 
181 Loc cit 
	  	  
59	  
practiced a cultural imperialist system of “luso-tropicalism”, where Portuguese 
customs, culture and Catholic religion were imposed on the local ethnic 
communities.182  
 
Nationalist groups eventually emerged in the post-World War era, when colonial 
powers began to gradually weaken. The FNLA, led by Holden Roberto was 
established in 1954, UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi in 1966 and MPLA led by 
Agostino Neto was established in 1956. Initially, the nationalist movements were 
ethnic based outfits. For instance, the FNLA was supported by Northern Uige and 
Cabinda peoples, who comprised of 12% of the population, while the MPLA’s 
support base was the M’bundu from Cetete-Malange areas located both in the 
hinterland and urban areas—particularly Luanda, including descendants of the mixed 
race “mesticos”, who comprised 27% of the population. UNITA’s support primarily 
emanated from the Ovimbundu from Southern Angola, who comprised 36% of the 
population.183 These differences were present both in the pre and post-colonial era. 
The armed rebellion against colonial rule was ignited by the colonial administration’s 
heavy-handed resistance of a mass protest against colonial rule in the country’s 
northern region in 1961, where between 250 and 1000 people (both black farm 
workers and white farmers) were killed.184 Subsequently, the FNLA, MPLA and 
UNITA began conducting guerrilla warfare against the colonial state, also supported 
by exiled groups in Kinshasa, Conakry, Brazzaville, Lisbon and Paris.185  
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Nevertheless, the movements did not successfully lead to decolonisation in Angola. 
The 1974 coup in Portugal against Marcelo Caetano’s regime led to the Alvor 
Agreement in 1975 between Portugal and the three nationalist movements. This led to 
the establishment of a transitional government that would lead to elections for the first 
post-colonial government.186 However, the transitional government collapsed due to 
internecine conflict between the three movements, and external actors also supported 
this violence due to Cold War interests. The FNLA and UNITA received American 
and Chinese support, and Agostino Neto’s MPLA was backed by the Soviet Union 
and Cuba. This external support largely shaped the character of the civil war, which 
would be eventually waged between UNITA and MPLA from 1975 to 2002. 
 
Political Independence and post-colonial military contestation 
The MPLA seized state power on November 11th 1975, sidelining FNLA and UNITA 
and establishing a Socialist one party rule that was recognised by most countries 
worldwide, except the United States. The MPLA, with strong backing from Cuba 
established a centrally planned Marxist-Leninist state from 1975 to the late 1980s.187  
Apart from actively controlling the economy, the authoritarian state restricted political 
activities and also banned civil society activities and any religions that were not 
aligned to the Catholic Church.188 The FNLA eventually disbanded following clashes 
with the MPLA in Luanda, while UNITA retreated to the hinterland, leading to a civil 
war pitting the two organisations against each other that claimed over 500 000 
lives. 189 Given the Cold War background, the MPLA-led state remained under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Ibid, p 451 
187 Meijer and Birmingham,  Op. Cit, p 14 
188 Loc cit 
189 Malaquis, A) (2001). “Making war and lots of money: The political economy of protracted conflict 
in Angola.” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 90 pp 521-536 p 521 
	  	  
61	  
constant threat from UNITA, backed by apartheid South Africa and the United 
States.190 The MPLA controlled Luanda, provincial and coastal towns and cities, and 
managed to expel UNITA from all urban centres with Cuban military backing by 
1976.191 Ethnic cleavages also acted as centrifugal forces to the violent clashes 
between UNITA and MPLA militias due to the ethnic-based support and mobilisation 
between the two parties.192   
 
Furthermore, MPLA militias targeted civilians in Luanda whose origins were from 
the northern or central highlands, because they were suspected to be UNITA 
supporters.193 This led to an exodus of internal refugees from Luanda to the highlands, 
where they fell under UNITA control. The war thus became territorialised between 
urban areas and the hinterland, and the population similarly divided.194 UNITA 
established its headquarters at Jamba in South East Angola by the 1980s, from where 
it orchestrated guerrilla tactics against the MPLA government. It established smaller 
bases in villages, providing a semblance of order and security, and basic social 
services such as running schools and providing primary healthcare.195 In addition to 
using rural dwellers for intelligence gathering, it also established compulsory youth 
recruitment into the UNITA army. In this way, UNITA created a state within a state, 
with Jamba as the capital.196 
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The new state’s insecurity was also elevated by several attempted coups such as the 
May 1977 abortive coup by Nito Alves, a Minister in Agostinho Neto’s government. 
The coup was bloodily suppressed and followed by purges of suspected dissidents 
from the party and government.197 In addition, since Portuguese settlers had departed 
en masse after the establishment of the independent state, this left the government and 
economy vulnerable from a serious skills shortage that also contributed to poor 
institutional development in both the state and economy. The insecurity and 
institutional decay gave way to a patron-client state, characterised by corruption and 
plunder, economic decline and the reliance on oil revenue as shall be elaborated 
below. By the 1990s however, there was a state of stalemate between the MPLA and 
UNITA particularly due to the end of the Cold War and this led to attempts at 
establishing peace between the two parties by African and Western actors. This 
included the 1988 New York Accords, that led to the partial withdrawal of external 
forces from Angola, the 1991 Bicesse Accords, that led to a ceasefire,  
demobilisation, formation of a unified army and police and paved way for 
elections.198  
 
However, the Bicesse accords collapsed in 1992 after Jonas Savimbi refused to accept 
electoral defeat to the MPLA and war resumed in 1993. The conflict became more 
brutal than the initial period after 1975, with UNITA seizing towns for the first time 
since 1976.199 However, the MPLA government troops made more thorough efforts to 
eliminate UNITA than before, and its military effort was bolstered by global sanctions 
against UNITA—particularly its sale of diamonds, which had become its major 
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source of finance after the Cold War era patronage from the United States had 
ended. 200  UNITA had also become more violent, displaying a more saliently 
predatory character.201  This led to heightened insecurity in the rural areas and despite 
a significant level of support from the hinterland initially; UNITA became 
criminalised and isolated both internally within Angola and the international 
community as well. The Lusaka Protocols in 1994, another significant effort at 
facilitating lasting peace also failed due to UNITA’s refusal to abide by the 
agreement. This also led to a formal declaration of the resumption of war in 1998 by 
MPLA’s Eduardo Dos Santos, who had succeeded Agostino Neto in 1979, a more 
aggressive government response and removal of people from the rural areas to 
prevent UNITA from using them as human shields as sources of food and other 
supplies. 202  
 
Generally, oil and diamonds became the source of finances that enabled both the 
MPLA and UNITA to wage the protracted civil war. For instance, oil production 
accounted for 80% of government revenue by the 1990s, generating over $5billion 
gross annual income.203 Given the state of insecurity for the government and country 
in general, the MPLA government developed an oil based enclave economy, with 
minimal diversification to other economic sectors and oil revenues were controlled by 
the presidency, MPLA and the party’s networks of clients.204 This undermined the 
economy’s sound potential in other economic sectors such as fisheries, agriculture, 
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and hydropower. The country’s oil wells were all offshore based, which provided a 
“sanctuary effect” for the MPLA and minimised UNITA’s reach.  
 
Thus, for instance the government funded substantial arms imports from oil money, 
such as $5billion worth of weapons imports in 1993, 1994 and 1999.205 On the other 
hand, diamonds provided UNITA with war funds, especially during the post-Cold 
War era. Diamond fields had already fallen outside the government’s control into 
UNITA’s hands by the late 1970s. Angola’s diamonds were mostly alluvial, and 
spread over a vast territory.206 As discussed in earlier sections, diamonds’ ease of 
transportation and portable nature provided discreet payment systems that fell outside 
global regulatory and monitoring systems. They also attracted multiple actors, from 
migrant diggers, local civilians, military units, local and external fortune seekers and 
global corporations. 207 Furthermore, UNITA “professionalised” diamond operations 
by 1983, through training staff in diamond sorting, investing in mining equipment for 
mining kimberlitic pipes, and seizing equipment from existing miners and diggers. By 
1988, UNITA was generating between $50 000-$4million monthly from diamond 
sales.208 In addition to its Angolan operations, UNITA also developed and seized 
more diamond mines in southern DRC, especially after MPLA seized some of its 
mines in late 1998.  
 
Nevertheless, unlike the MPLA’s oil, diamonds did not provide a stable revenue 
source for UNITA due to the absence of the “sanctuary effect”. For instance, in 
addition to the diamonds being located onshore, and thus being susceptible to the 	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MPLA’s control, UNITA lacked capital to develop kimberlitic diamond mining and 
suffered constant military attacks from the MPLA forces. After 1998, the United 
Nations also imposed sanctions against UNITA diamond trade and this led to a sharp 
drop in its revenues, from $600-700million in 1996 to $120 – 300 000 by 1999.209 In 
addition, UNITA sub-commanders had a significant degree of autonomy, which led to 
the undercutting of revenue to the central party and criminalisation of the industry in 
general due to multiple actors.  
 
Establishing the “Universo” 
Founded in 1976, Sonangol was thus the MPLA government’s oil fund manager 
during the war and it has morphed into a global corporate behemoth since then. Given 
the militarised political contestation in Angola, the government established an 
authoritarian Marxist-Leninist regime as alluded to above, and the culture of 
authoritarian rule remains to date. Despite its conversion to a neoliberal economic 
system by the early 1990s, the Angolan state has maintained an exclusive political 
patronage system that is dependent on oil revenues. Oil exploration started in the mid 
1950s in Angola, although the Portuguese settler government had created a diversified 
economy in the terminal years of colonial rule, particularly since the late 1960s. This 
included sisal, coffee, cotton, diamonds, iron ore and oil exports, with the latter only 
being exported starting in 1973 by ANGOL, the state owned oil company.210  
 
Just after independence in 1975, the MPLA established a National Commission for 
the Restructuring of the Petroleum Sector (NCRPS), led by Percy Freudenthal, a 
white Angolan businessman with ties to Agostino Neto since the 1950s, Morais 	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Guerra, a lawyer, and Desiderio Costa, an engineer.211 This reflected the expert-driven 
genesis of Angola’s post-colonial oil economy, which was to characterise Sonangol’s 
growth and expansion. Further development of the oil sector included the 
appropriation of ANGOL’s assets, although the company’s colonial-era staff was 
retained. The MPLA also invited back Western oil companies that had left at the end 
of colonial rule and the beginning of the civil war, including US companies Gulf Oil, 
Texaco, and Petrofina.212 In this way, the MPLA expressly rejected the nationalisation 
of the oil sector, instead opting to create a government-sheltered private enterprise-
driven system. Thus, while it established a centrally planned Marxist political and 
economic system, the government managed the oil sector using a flexible, pragmatic 
approach that was insulated from the clientelist and prebendal political system.213  
 
Sonangol was formally established in June 1976, as the sole concessionaire, regulator, 
and tax collector for the oil industry. In this way, it was both an oil company and a 
private player and regulator, on behalf of the government, or specifically, the MPLA 
presidency. Apart from establishing contractual relationships with the aforementioned 
oil firms and others such as Algerian state-owned oil company Sonatrach, Sonangol 
also recruited expert staff both from Angola and other places worldwide, conducted 
staff training programmes, secured US consultancy firm Arthud D. Little’s 
services. 214  The latter attracted Neto’s criticism, although his panel of trusted 
lieutenants convinced him of the partnership’s necessity despite the MPLA’s hostile 
relations with the United States.215 By 1983, Sonangol had begun pumping and 
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marketing oil globally, and created a London office to facilitate direct trading into the 
European market and elsewhere.  
 
By 1989, Sonangol had grown into a robust corporate holding company, with a 1989 
World Bank report highlighting the company’s expert-led growth amidst the dire lack 
of skill within the rest of the Angolan economy.216 In 1991, Sonangol had been 
consolidated into a holding company, “Sonangol EP” with a variety of subsidiaries in 
other oil and non-oil economic sectors such as new oil well exploration, distribution, 
training services for the petroleum industry, air transport, shipping, insurance and risk 
management, banking and various philanthropic endeavours as well.217  A more 
fascinating factor was that Sonangol’s growth and consolidation occurred amidst the 
civil war, and thus funded the MPLA’s government and counter-insurgency efforts. 
For instance, amidst an 80% rebel-occupation of the Angolan territory in 1993, 
Sonangol remained unaffected and instead grew its investor base, drilled new oil 
wells and allowed new companies such as BP, Shell, Exxon, Petrobras and China’s 
Sinopec into Angola’s oil market.218 The company continued earning substantial 
revenues, with an estimated $17-23billion between 2003-2008. The company’s 
growth led to a high global reputation, and it maintains a culture of efficiency and 
world-class corporate image to date. In comparison, other state corporations such as 
the diamond parastatal ENDIAMA and national airline TAAG do not rival 
Sonangol’s expertise and global reputation.219 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 de Oliveria, Op. Cit, p 602 
217 Ibid, p 603 
218 Loc cit 
219 de Oliveria, Op. Cit, p 604 
	  	  
68	  
Factors that account for Sonangol’s growth and success amidst a civil war are varied, 
but rotate around the rentier ambitions of the MPLA elite. The latter has been 
described as the Angolan ‘strategic command posts of power’ between the party, 
bureaucracy, military and Sonangol executives; or the hegemony of powerful 
domestic actors.220 Skilled personnel connected to President Neto by blood and 
friendship ties have been at the forefront of managing the company and this fostered 
loyalty and trust within the governing elite. Dubbed “Futungo de Belas”, the clique is 
widely regarded as a parallel state due to the extent to which Sonangol marginalises 
and undermines government ministries221. This, for instance allowed the Sonangol 
management teams the leeway to forge partnerships with US companies (like Gulf 
and Texaco), who at the same time were critical of MPLA led government’s Marxist 
inclinations222. The company morphed into a massive holding corporation particularly 
after the abandonment of Marxism in the 1990s, although this introduced crony 
capitalism instead. Power (2001) argues that the civil war shaped the development of 
Sonangol and subsequent ‘kleptocratic’ state traditions due to the struggle for survival 
against militarised domestic contestation.223  
 
As alluded to above, the company created an ‘oil enclave’, where revenues are 
reinvested into its subsidiaries and expansion efforts instead of being channelled to 
the state. Domestic economic investment is also stifled through the monopoly of 
businesspeople connected to Sonangol and its patrons who have exclusive access to 
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investments in strategic sectors of the economy224. As a result, it has become the most 
politically and economically important institution in Angola. This is in light of dire 
human conditions that resulted in the World Bank branding it a ‘failed state’ on the 
Human Development Indicators (HDI).225 Nevertheless, according to Hodges (2001), 
this cannot be ascribed to the ‘resource curse’ but deliberate, systematic 
misappropriation of revenue for patrimonial agendas.226 Collier (2000) also notes that 
institutionalised corruption has become integral to the political system, with networks 
of loyalty being essential to its survival.227  
 
Therefore, the 100% ownership model employed by Angola’s government during the 
civil war was motivated by the militarised political contestation that it faced since the 
establishment of the new state. Sonangol was established to serve the MPLA’s 
immediate financial interests in consolidating its power and hegemony, with both 
domestic and external opposition emanating from the Cold War context. However, 
this has also become a post-civil war reality. Apart from being immune from ministry 
or legislative oversight, Sonangol is in effect a “parallel state”, conducting 
autonomous financial transactions on behalf of the MPLA independent of the rest of 
the state institutions. For instance, Sonangol has been implicated in money 
laundering, running of debts against future oil production for weapons purchase both 
during and after the civil war, and providing oil backed loans for the state elite 
without any regulatory control.228 As a result, the International Monetary Fund 
reported on the Angolan financial “Bermuda Triangle”, where $4,22 billion 	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disappeared between 1997-2002, and suspected to have been embezzled by the 
MPLA-linked elite.229  
 
In light of the above, it can be concluded that militarised political contestation 
resulted in the ownership structure adopted by the MPLA government in 1976. From 
the outset, Sonangol was established to serve the state’s rentier interests, primarily to 
serve as the primary source of revenue for the war effort and fund its patrimonial state 
system. Although the government established Sonangol instrumentally, the domestic 
and international context shaped this development. Since UNITA was backed by the 
United States and South Africa, this resulted in considerable insecurity for the MPLA-
led state and thus Sonangol and the institutions of the state served as buffers against 
the military challenge posed by the civil war. In addition, the regime type was also 
shaped by the context, since the MPLA did not have an incentive to establish a 
democratic system. The legacy of colonialism was also influential in this regard; both 
in having oil exploration commence through ANGOL prior to independence, and the 
MPLA taking over the colonial state’s authoritarian institutional apparatus. 
 
Botswana’s Debswana in comparative perspective 
Historical Overview 
Botswana is the world’s largest diamond producer by value, and a unique case in that 
despite its diamond revenue, the country has managed to avoid the typical trappings 
of resource wealth in African countries. It is a landlocked southern African state with 
an approximately 2 million-population size and two-thirds of the country is desert and 
semi-desert. A former British Protectorate, it came under British patronage in 1885, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 Loc cit 
	  	  
71	  
following entreaties by the Batswana chiefs to seek protection against the encroaching 
Germans from the east in Namibia, and Afrikaners in South Africa to the south-
east.230 Botswana has a more ethnically homogenous Tswana society, although it is 
also differentiated along sub-ethnic lines. The eight sub-ethnic groups are the 
Bangwato, Batawana, Bangwaketse, Bakwena, Belete, Bakgatla, Barolong and 
Batlokwa.231 Since the establishment of the Protectorate in 1885, the British did not 
establish elaborate administrative structures, but assigned a resident magistrate and 
district commissioners. Nevertheless, the policy of indirect rule was applied, with 
chiefs functioning as colonial proxies particularly in recruiting young men for mine 
labour in South Africa and collection of taxes.  
 
Unlike Angola, Botswana did not experience a militarised confrontation with the 
colonial administration. Nevertheless, the banning of the African National Congress 
and PAC in the 1960s led to significant numbers of exiles to Botswana. This 
influenced the growth of nationalist sentiments in the territory, although the gradual 
slide to independence was predominantly peaceful.232 The British began granting 
political concessions in the 1960s, with the establishment of Legislative Councils 
consisting of representatives from the various Tswana tribes and districts and 
European settlers. This led to the country’s first general elections in 1965, which 
established an inclusive government.233 Seretse Khama, a Ngwato chief became the 
Prime Minister and he led negotiations for an independent Botswana with the British. 
This resulted in the peaceful transition on 30 September 1966. In the first post-
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independence elections held in 1969, Seretse Khama’s Botswana Democratic Party 
(BDP) won 28 out of the 31 seats in parliament and has won every subsequent 
election since then.  
 
Political independence and post-colonial democratic contestation 
Botswana’s Protectorate colonial rule was an advantage in various respects. Unlike 
other colonies that were characterised by larger settler populations and institutional 
changes, the Protectorate system ensured that its pre-colonial forms of social, political 
and economic organisation remained largely undisturbed. This is one of the primary 
cultural foundations guaranteeing the stability of its democratic system that rests on 
Tswana “kgotla” cultural practices, characterised by an interactive and transparent 
relationship between the traditional chiefs and their subjects.234 Botswana’s post-
independence political system was also inimical to Britain’s Westminster 
parliamentary model. It established a universal adult franchise, and a pluralist “first 
past the post”, electoral system with single member constituencies. Its unicameral 
parliament consisted of 34 elected and 4 specially appointed members of the 
unicameral National Assembly, the Attorney General and the President.235  
 
Prior to 1969’s constitutional amendment, which created the position of a President---
who is both head of state and government, the Prime Minister was the head of 
government. The president is directly elected through receiving more than half of the 
parliamentary constituencies, with the majority MPs confirming the winning party’s 
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candidate in parliament.236 He forms a cabinet from ministers who are also members 
of the National Assembly.237  Although the president’s power is in some way 
constrained by the parliament, the executive generally holds sway over the National 
Assembly. For instance, the Assembly is empowered to declare a vote of confidence 
in the government, leading to either the Assembly electing a new president or the 
incumbent dissolving parliament and calling for a new general election.238  
 
The president is also empowered to dissolve parliament if the House presents a bill 
that he would not accept, which the House would also have refused to compromise 
upon. 239   Thus, the executive has relative power over the legislature. Given 
Botswana’s party politics, where the BDP is the de facto dominant governing party, 
these legislative instruments meant to challenge executive power have not been 
effectively used since independence. In addition, the House of Chiefs was established 
as an advisory unit of parliament that also debates issues directly pertaining to 
traditional governance and communal issues such as the use of land and management 
of natural resources. It consists of eight chiefs from each of the Tswana tribes, and 
four representatives from ethnic minority groups. Despite its non-legislative role, this 
proximity to the legislative processes of parliament and informal linkages with the 
ruling BDP allows the House of Chiefs to exercise a notable degree of influence on 
the government’s policy making processes.240It this represents the incorporation of the 
country’s indigenous forms of governance into the modern state. 
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Political parties were formed as far back as 1959 in Botswana, with the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate Federal Party (BFPD) although this became defunct by 1962. 241 
Subsequently, the Bechuanaland People’s Party (BPP) was formed, and mostly driven 
by young South African educated nationalists influenced by the African National 
Congress and PAC. The BPP neither had links with traditional power structures, nor 
rural support but pursued radical politics that rattled the colonial administration. 
However, the BPP was fragmented by 1964, with a splinter Bechuanaland 
Independent Party being formed afterwards. The BDP was established in 1962 and 
became the most formidable political party in Botswana to date. Led by Seretse 
Khama, it was supported by four main influential social groups, that is, traditional 
authorities, educated elites, cattle ranchers, settler Europeans and the colonial 
administration.242   
 
European support was significant in that it became the basis for administrative 
cooperation through legislative councils, prior to independence and post-
independence state building as well. This support base boosted the BDP’s electoral 
odds since the most influential local and colonial social groups, who had vested 
interests in the country’s political fortunes, constituted it. For instance, Seretse 
Khama, as a traditional chief played a central role in rallying his fellow traditional 
leaders around the party and their rural subjects with them, and this rural support base 
guarantees BDP’s electoral victories to date. In the first election in 1965, the BDP 
won by 81% (28 seats), the Botswana People’s Party attained 3 seats and Botswana 
Independent Party did not win any.243  
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A new party, the Botswana National Front (BNF) was established in 1969 and 
contested in the election that year. The party was typically left leaning, and criticised 
the BDP’s cooperation with the British.244 African workers, lower level civil servants, 
some traditional rulers and their subjects, mainly supported it. With regards to the 
latter, Chief Bathoen of the Bangwaketse tribe in southern Botswana represented a 
concervative bloc of traditional leaders who were disgruntled by Khama’s dilution of 
the chiefs’ authority in rural areas after independence. For instance, the government 
established District Councils (DC) as the delegated rural authorities, and this led to 
chiefs losing substantial political power and authority, such as the right to give land, 
licencing private businesses, and the implementation of development projects.245 
Chiefs are also prohibited from holding political office and maintain their traditional 
duties at the same time, so Bathoen had to abdicate and joined the BNF.246 However, 
the BDP maintained a strong political hegemony in the country as the table (below) 
shows, which minimised the effects of democratic political contestation on the 
government’s policies.247 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Electoral statistics 1969-1989248 	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Nevertheless, the first past-the-post electoral system has often led to a 
disproportionate representation between votes cast and seats won.249 As reflected in 
the Fig. 3 above, the total share of votes received by the BDP had dropped since 1974 
but the increasing number of seats that it has won in each election masks this fact. In 
addition, gerrymandering was an influential factor, with larger constituencies in the 
rural areas and smaller (and fewer) urban constituencies.250 Political opposition 
remained fragmented and weak during this period, with an attempt to creating an 
umbrella People’s Progressive Front collapsing in 1991.251 The BNF remained the 
most definitive opposition, and remained radically opposed to the BDP’s neoliberal 
policies and proposing socialist rule instead.  
 
In addition, opposition political culture was still in its infancy in the first decade after 
independence, and as reflected in the table above, the total share of votes cast for the 
opposition had been steadily growing despite their failure to win substantial numbers 
of seats. This is attributed to the changing social dynamics in the country, particularly 
the growth of a middle class in which opposition politics has growth faster than it did 
in the rural areas mainly due to their being traditional BDP strongholds. The BDP also 
maintained its strong rural support base also due to its government social programmes 
such as health, roads, access to water and transfer of subsidies that boost its 
legitimacy in the eyes of the masses.252 Although the Ngwato, which is Seretse 
Khama’s ethnic tribal group was (and still is) the dominant sub-tribal group, ethnicity 	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has not been a significant mobilising factor the way it was in Angola and other 
African states. For instance, following his death in 1980, Seretse Khama was replaced 
by Quett Masire (1980-1998), who was not from the Bamangwato. The BDP has also 
maintained its electoral dominance throughout his successors Festus Mogae (1998-
2008) and Ian Khama (2008-current). Thus the BDP conducted a balancing act of 
appealing to traditional leaders and rural masses, providing social goods, establishing 
a neoliberal framework that accommodated the colonial power and transitioned to a 
multiparty democratic system. Its rejection of radical socialist ideology also reflects 
astute political opportunism that facilitated the development of strong state 
institutions supported by external powers, especially Britain.253 
 
Although the civil society grew in post-colonial Botswana, with sector-specific trade 
unions and the media being the most prominent, they were not a source of political 
contestation against the BDP-led government. For instance, the Department of Labour 
and Social Security (DLSS) registered fifteen trade unions in 1989, including the 
Botswana Diamond Sorters Valuators Union and Botswana Mining Workers 
Union.254 The Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU), which was an umbrella 
organisation comprising of various individual unions was also registered. The 
Botswana Civil Servants Association, Botswana Teachers Union and Botswana 
Federation of Secondary School Teachers were white collar-employee based unions 
that however did not register with the government. The Botswana Employers 
Federation (BEF) was established to represent employers’ interests and gained a 
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reputation for being a well run, resourced and politically connected interest group.255 
Despite most of the trade unions being weak and disorganised, the Botswana Mining 
Workers Union (BMWU) is the most formidable, with significant leverage in 
bargaining with employers regarding remuneration, but still possesses limited 
political clout.256 Botswana’s trade unions did not have notable linkages to any of the 
political parties, although the BNF’s left-leaning ideological standing found 
resonance with some of the workers’ interests.257 Nevertheless a consensus tradition 
has existed between the unions and the government, with the department of Labour 
and Social Security being able to facilitate successful negotiations between various 
employers and employees since independence.  
 
The media was not a formidable civil society actor prior to the 1980s. For instance, 
weekly and bi-weekly private newspapers appeared in 1988, with a small circulation 
margin totalling 33 00 copies a week.258 The government owned Botswana Daily 
News newspaper, which was the country’s only daily paper, and also distributed free 
of charge. Since it was a state owned paper, it was neither critical of the government’s 
policies nor particularly attentive to the activities of opposition political parties 
especially during elections.259 The private press, which was in its infancy in the 1980s 
was also not particularly interested in reporting on political issues, except Mmegi wa 
Dikgang (The Reporter) which often contained critical opinion pieces on current 
affairs. 260  Generally, freedom of the press existed in Botswana, with direct 
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government opposition or stifling of the media being absent. A significant clash 
between the government and Mmegi however occurred in 1991, when the paper 
published a confidential internal government document in a report on the manual 
workers’ strike that year, which led to the offices being ransacked by the government 
and some foreign journalists being deported.261 262  
 
Economic policy and formation of Debswana 
Seretse Khama established a liberal and moderate government in 1966, unlike his 
peers in the newly independent African countries who were ideologically inclined to 
Marxist-Leninist ideas, including Angola. This factor played a significant role in the 
country’s economic development in general and the formation of Debswana in 
particular because of the absence of radical, ideologically driven policies that would 
have either led to drastic economic policies or polarising political developments.263 
Also, since Botswana was one of the six poorest countries at the time of 
independence, it depended on Britain for budgetary support. Nevertheless, Khama’s 
government was driven by three main policy objectives. It focused on development 
planning, with equitable resource allocation to all economic sectors. This accounts for 
the development of a strong parastatal system in the country. Secondly, it established 
a policy of active government involvement in developing the private sector, in order 
to drive economic diversification. Third, Khama’s government sought to reduce 
dependency on Britain and fund the government from internal resources.264  
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Several factors that account for Botswana’s post-colonial economic policies and 
development can be demarcated into two main phases. Firstly, the transitional phase 
(between 1960s-1975) saw the establishment of an independent Botswana through 
peaceful negotiations with the British, a democratic system and a market-based 
economy. Further, the 1967 Mines and Minerals Act gave full mineral rights to the 
central government, thus making it the sole guarantor of exploration rights and 
granting it full access to any mineral revenue. This Act was sensitive due to the patent 
usurpation of power from chiefs, in whose localities mines would be established. It 
also enabled the government to direct the resource management model that it 
eventually adopted without contestation from non-state groups.  
 
In addition, negotiation and political inclusion thus forestalled chiefs’ opposition to 
the centralisation of control over the newly discovered mines, such as Orapa and 
Selebi Phikwe, both located in Seretse Khama’s ethnic Bangwato districts. 265 
Furthermore, Khama negotiated Botswana’s SACU membership, which provided an 
additional source of revenues and also allowed more foreign mining prospectors to 
explore for new mines in Botswana.266 Khama’s policies were thus characterised by 
pragmatism and adoption of Western (mostly British) institutional features of the 
state, coupled with a conscious integration of indigenous practices. Nevertheless, this 
initial period of growth was buttressed by foreign aid and capital flows, particularly 
from the British Exchequer between 1966-89.267 	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The second phase, between 1975 and 1989 was characterised by the consolidation of 
the above-mentioned political and economic institutional frameworks. This period 
also saw the rapid growth of Botswana’s economy through the growth of its beef 
industry. The government managed to successfully negotiate two key partnerships 
that boosted the beef industry. Firstly, it secured the access of Botswana’s beef into 
the European market through the Botswana Meat Company. This was also result of 
rural elite interests, since two-thirds of the political leadership in the National 
Assembly (including Khama) were cattlemen.268  Secondly, the government secured 
50% shareholding of the diamond-mining corporation (Debswana), a joint venture 
with the world’s largest diamond company (De Beers) in 1975. This ‘smart’ 
partnership allowed government to maintain a foothold into the country’s most 
lucrative diamond industry, which eventually overtook the beef industry. While it 
resembled ‘nationalisation’ at the time, the deal allowed for effective private sector 
management of the industry, while guaranteeing the transfer of rents to the central 
government. It also facilitated public-private consultation on policy regimes.  
 
The mining sector eventually emerged as the main driver of economic growth and this 
also strengthened the BDP’s political power.  In addition, the Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning emerged as an important bureaucracy that managed the 
country’s economic growth since 1970.269 This therefore shows that the genesis of 
diamond mining in Botswana came against a well-established policy framework that 
aimed to diversify the government’s source of revenue, and most importantly 
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Khama’s government’s pursuit of a neoliberal framework that would be 
accommodative of public-private partnerships.  
 
The exploration of diamonds in Botswana can be traced back to 1954, when De Beers 
began diamond prospecting in Botswana, with minimal successes until 1966.270 De 
Beers geologists found the first kimberlitic pipe at Orapa, located near the country’s 
second largest city of Francistown in the south west in April 1967.271  It would later 
become the second largest kimberlitic mine worldwide. The company proceeded to 
establish the De Beers Botswana Mining Company (later Debswana) jointly with 
Khama’s government in June 1968. The company further discovered several 
kimberlitic deposits, including Botswana’s largest (Jwaneng) in 1972. Initially, De 
Beers owned 85% of the company, while Botswana’s government held 15%.272  The 
government’s decision not to nationalise the diamond mines was premised on a 
rational consideration that it lacked sufficient capacity to build the mining operations, 
and this was a crucial factor in the subsequent growth of the diamond industry in 
Botswana.  
 
Eventually, the government renegotiated the agreement with De Beers in 1969, 
resulting in the increase of the government’s stake from 15 to 50% as mentioned 
above.273 Currently, the company operates four diamond mines (Orapa, Letlhakane, 
Jwaneng and Damtshaa) and controls all diamond mining in Botswana.274  It is 
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managed by a Board of Directors consisting of 12 members, with half of the directors 
being assigned from Botswana’s government and the other half by De Beers. This 
became one of the most successful public-private partnerships in the world, with 
Botswana benefiting from De Beers’ position as the largest diamond trader, while the 
government provided the company with primary access to the world’s largest 
diamond-producing territory by value.  
 
A brief profile of the company reveals its uniquely privileged position in the global 
diamond market, which plays a central role in shaping the state of Botswana’s 
diamond management policy. English-born colonial-era businessman Cecil John 
Rhodes established De Beers in 1880 in colonial-era South Africa, and the company 
became the sole diamond miner in the country by 1888, and accounted for 90% of the 
world’s rough diamond production by 1902.275 By then, Ernest Oppenheimer, under 
whose direction the company established exclusive contracts with suppliers and 
buyers, thus establishing a global monopoly, ran it. Following the global price slump 
caused by the Great Depression in 1932, De Beers launched a global marketing 
campaign from the United States in 1939, leading to its most effective campaign in 
1947 where the company adopted the motto, “a diamond is forever.” 276  Thus 
diamonds became associated with love and marriage, leading to a dramatic growth in 
demand and corresponding growth of prices in the United States. Using the same 
approach, the company also established a market foothold in other countries, such as 
Japan in 1967. It has since established a dominant global market foothold, with 39 
stores worldwide.  De Beers’ ability to control the price and supply of a significant 	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percentage of diamond sales worldwide through its Central Selling Organisation 
diamond cartel also guarantees profitability to the Botswana government through the 
joint ownership structure.277 
 
Therefore, political contestation was not a contributory factor leading to the 
government’s adoption of the public-private ownership model with De Beers. 
Although the democratic system was relatively robust and transparent, with the 
system being reinforced by the kgotla cultural values that embedded the practice of 
interactive leadership, this did not directly influence the government’s adoption of a 
public-private ownership model in Debswana. Political opposition was also weak 
during the first few years of independence, during which the De Beers Mining 
Company (later, Debswana) was established. Diamond mining was not negatively 
affected by political dynamics, with political leaders’ rational choices accounting for 
the decision to establish a joint partnership with De Beers.  
 
In addition, Botswana’s discovery of diamonds after the end of colonial rule was a 
significant factor contributing to the stability of the sector and the country’s politics. 
Since the establishment of political institutions preceded diamond revenues, that pre-
empted chances of the colonial state establishing a state monopoly over the resource 
sector, which would have been likely adopted in the post-colonial era. The diamond 
sector was also established during Seretse Khama’s presidency, and his leadership 
choices thus largely shaped the ownership model taken. As a British-educated 
political leader, Khama’s personal experiences considerably influenced his 
relationship with the British and subsequent policy choices that he made. Political 
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contestation could have come from the chiefs, whose powers were significantly 
reduced at independence, but Khama, being a traditional chief himself played a 
central role in co-opting them into the new democratic government. 
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Chapter 5: Analysis and Conclusion 
 
 
This study has investigated the extent to which a causal relationship exists between 
domestic political conditions and ownership structures adopted in state corporations 
in extractive natural resource rich countries. This was conducted through comparing 
the cases of Angola’s Sonangol and Botswana’s Debswana. It has also applied the 
historical institutionalist approach, which is a constructivist-oriented theoretical 
framework to comparative politics, to determine the predictability of political 
contestation resulting in the creation of peculiar ownership structures. In addition, it 
has also discussed key literature regarding the establishment of the modern state in 
Africa, natural the management of extractive natural resources and political regimes. 
The study concludes on the following points. 
 
Firstly, colonial rule and the nature of the political transition to independence has 
proven to be a key causal variable in shaping resource rich countries’ political 
trajectories. Settler colonies such as Angola tended to have an increased likelihood for 
cultural and institutional change, due to the influx of European settlers and subsequent 
political and economic institutions that were created. It also increased the likelihood 
of more radicalised nationalist movements being created, which in some cases would 
be militarised due to the context of the Cold War. Angola became a theatre of Cold 
War proxy wars between the United States and South Africa and UNITA on one end, 
and China, Cuba and MPLA on another. Settler colonies also experienced militarised 
transitions to independence and this shaped post-colonial institution building. Angola 
did not attain political independence as a result of an outright military victory, but by 
the time negotiations were held in 1975 the country already had radicalised and armed 
	  	  
87	  
groups, which laid the foundation for civil war. Botswana, on the other hand 
experienced a much less dense settler population, lower level of cultural and 
institutional dilution and thus did not inherit flawed colonial state traditions. It was 
also able to build state and economic institutions in a non-militarised and cooperative 
atmosphere with the former British colonial power, and this substantially influenced 
the nature of the political system and choices made by political leaders in establishing 
a public-private partnership ownership structure with De Beers. 
 
Secondly, this paper established that political contestation does always directly 
influence resource rich states’ ownership structures. Angola experienced militarised 
political contestation, while Botswana neither experienced military nor non-military 
contestation. The latter established a government through the founding political 
party’s vantage point as a conglomeration of the country’s dominant social groups. It 
also benefited from the absence of strong political opposition and a wider support 
base both from local clients and the British government to create a rationally directed 
policy framework. In this way, the absence of strong political contestation actually 
accounts for Botswana’s adoption of a public-private ownership model. This 
contradicts Luong and Weithal (2006)’s assumption that political contestation would 
increase the likelihood of public-private ownership models, since the central state 
would be compelled to be more accountable. The MPLA, on the other hand faced 
pervasive insecurity from the founding stages of its statehood from internal 
belligerents who were supported by powerful regional (apartheid South Africa) and 
external (United States) patrons. Establishing a powerful national oil company was 
thus a rational decision aimed at funding its war effort. In this regard, it cannot be 
argued that oil necessarily incentivises authoritarian rule but in this case, the MPLA 
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government faced peculiar circumstances of insecurity that necessitated having a 
stable, guaranteed source of revenue. In this case, political contestation led to the 
formation of a monopolistic ownership model, unlike Luong and Weinthal’s 
assumption to the contrary. 
 
 
Thirdly, the type of extractive natural resource conditionally influenced ownership 
structures taken by a government. This study examined both oil and diamond rich 
cases respectively, and the resource type did not directly influence ownership 
structures. Diamonds are usually associated with a higher opportunity variable for 
adverse outcomes such as violence or corruption, due to their portability and ease of 
trade, but only on the condition that they are alluvial, not kimberlitic. In this case, 
Botswana has the latter, and it required the same level of capital and technical input as 
oil, thus preventing the multiple actor variable’s influence. Angola has offshore oil, 
and this would have ideally reduced the likelihood of violence since corporate and 
government elites, instead of multiple individual actors would centralise extraction 
and access to revenue. Therefore, the type of natural resource did not directly 
influence ownership structures in these cases and it can be argued that it is a 
conditional variable. If the oil is mined onshore and diamonds are alluvial, this could 
influence resource-type based ownership structures due to the presence of multiple 
actors. 
 
Fourth, the timing of the extraction of natural resources influenced ownership 
structures adopted in the cases under consideration. In Angola, the colonial 
government had begun pumping oil prior to independence in 1975 through a state 
monopoly, ANGOL. When the MPLA seized control of the state, it took over the 
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colonial monopolistic ownership structure and perpetuated the centralised revenue 
appropriation system. Botswana, on the other hand commenced diamond extraction 
after independence in 1967, and this facilitated the pre-resource extraction 
establishment and consolidation of state structures and a political system that would 
accommodate a public-private ownership structure. This is also linked with the 
regime type, in a way, because the Angolan case inherited a centralised authoritarian 
regime from colonialism, whereas Botswana inherited embryonic state systems that 
the post-colonial government constructed fashioned alongside the British system that 
also incorporated local cultural practices and alliances. If, for instance diamond 
extraction had commenced prior to independence, this would have resulted in a more 
established colonial state and economic system, making a centralised ownership 
structure more likely. 
 
Furthermore, Angola fits the typology of both a gatekeeper and rhizome state, as 
argued by Bayart and Cooper and this is drawn from colonial inheritance and 
domestic political institutions. As indicated above, it took over the colonial state 
apparatus and used it to entrench its power. Given the context of a Cold War proxy 
war already discussed, the MPLA was not incentivised to establish a democratic state 
but a gatekeeper state. It was thus necessary to create a wholly owned national oil 
company to fund the war effort and patronage based politics. The marginalisation of 
ethnic groups aligned to UNITA was also patterned along the same instrumental 
purposes used in the ethnic based political party formation and mobilisation patterns 
pursued by the three main nationalist groups prior to independence. Thus, Angola 
became a corrupt state system not only based on greed but political expediency. 
Botswana does not necessarily fit the typology of a gatekeeper or rhizome state the 
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way Angola does. The BDP’s dominance of the political system, based on its 
domestic alliances is tantamount to de facto state capture, although its choice to 
establish a public-private partnership deviates from the features of gatekeeper states. 
It also sustains a relatively open political system, which although it is not perfect, is 
relatively stronger than other resource rich states on the continent. 
 
Historical institutionalism is thus a befitting theoretical framework to employ in 
determining the relationship between political contestation and ownership structures 
in resource rich states. As a constructivist-based theory, it disproves the usage of 
either utilitarian or path-dependent conceptions of political phenomena. In this case 
for instance, historical institutionalism explores themes of power and interests, with 
institutions being products of the interaction between social, political and economic 
actors working in different contexts. In this case, domestic political conditions largely 
explain the cases’ outcomes with mineral resource management. It cannot be 
expressly argued that democracy explains Botswana’s choice to establish a joint 
ownership structure with De Beers, but that the combined effects of its colonial 
experience, state system established before and after independence and individual 
leaders’ choices did. Conversely, Botswana defies the rational prediction that post-
colonial states capture rent-generating economic sectors to fund corrupt, patrimonial 
political systems. It also negates the claim that democratic contestation would lead to 
a public-private ownership model. 
 
Also, it can not be argued that Angola’s authoritarian post-colonial government only 
seized oil revenues for patrimonial ends, but the combined result of its colonial 
heritage, culture of pre-colonial ethnic based political mobilisation, pre-colonial 
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militarisation, the role of the Cold War and the security situation in which MPLA 
established the first post-colonial Angolan government explain the ownership 
structures chosen in managing oil revenue. The above discussion validates the 
historical institutionalist claim that causality is contextual, and complex 
configurations become apparent through historical comparative observation, and that 
contingent combination of historical facts can largely shape particular outcomes. This 
also nuances “resource curse” outcomes that perceive the relationship between the 
presence of extractive natural resources, political structures and forms of ownership in 
state corporations as a given. 
 
Nevertheless, the theory falls short in its “retrospective rationality”, or historically 
based approach, which gives it minimal predictive abilities. It does not factor in the 
significance of human agency as much as it should, instead attributing political 
developments to chance, twists of fate and contingencies of history, thus reducing its 
empirical purview. For instance, the ownership structures in Botswana may be argued 
to be solely dependent on individual factors surrounding its first post-independence 
President, Seretse Khama who apart from being educated at Oxford, and experiencing 
the British political and economic systems, was also married to a Briton, Ruth 
Williams. Thus a rational choice approach would surmise that his rapport with the 
British and neoliberal leanings were based on his socialisation and mobilisation of 
political allies who shared his views. Nevertheless, it substantially facilitates a 
nuanced understanding of the historical dynamics that gave rise to the ownership 
structures adopted at the creation of Sonangol and Debswana. 
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